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Summary 
This thesis discusses The Law of Peoples (1999) in light of two main questions. These 
questions are:  
(1) Can the conception of human rights Rawls adopts in the Law of Peoples be 
plausibly defended? 
(2) Bearing in mind the criticisms of Rawls’s conception of human rights identified in 
the treatment of question (1), how can the Law of Peoples be adjusted in a way 
that affords added normative force to the idea of positive duties across societies? 
Question (1) is approached by discussing three interpretations of Rawls’s justification for his 
narrow conception of human rights. The argumentation proceeds in the following manner: 
Firstly I argue that the fact that some peoples or persons have distorted conceptions about 
morality is not a compelling reason to exclude certain rights from the human rights principle. 
This argument is in line with common liberal criticisms of Rawls, presented by for instance 
Allen Buchanan (2006). Furthermore I argue that the fact that the dominant groupings within 
a society reject important liberal rights is not a convincing argument for the claim there is 
internal political legitimacy in decent societies. 
Secondly I discuss Samuel Freeman’s (2006b) proposed justification of Rawls’s list of 
human rights. Freeman argues that the representatives for liberal peoples in the original 
position should be modelled as exclusively self-interested. From this he argues that they 
would endorse the same list of human rights presented by Rawls. I claim that this argument 
fails at three levels. 1. It is in fact unclear that such representatives would endorse Rawls’s list 
of human rights. 2. Freeman’s justification for the human rights principle is unappealingly 
instrumental. 3. To model the representatives of liberal peoples as uninterested in the human 
rights situation in other societies is implausible. Furthermore, it seems to contradict what 
Rawls himself writes. 
Third I discuss David A. Reidy’s (2006) proposed justification of Rawls’s list of 
human rights. Rawls’s list of human rights only contains those rights he believes are 
internationally enforceable. As such they challenge the self-determination of states that do not 
respect them. Reidy argues that it would be unreasonable of liberal peoples to agree to a list of 
internationally enforceable human rights that allows coercive liberalization of certain well-
ordered non-liberal peoples. Although this argument is associated with certain problems, I 
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claim that it provides a plausible defence of Rawls’s list of human rights. However, it opens 
up a new discussion on whether the role of human rights in a theory of international justice 
should be to specify when it in principle is legitimate to apply forceful intervention. Upon 
addressing this discussion I argue that the Law of Peoples allows room for a contemporary 
understanding of the role of human rights. Furthermore I argue that since the Law of Peoples 
is a theory that deals with the question of recognitional legitimacy and not internal political 
legitimacy, Rawls does not confound justification and enforcement issues, nor ideal and non-
ideal theory. Rather, it is his critics that confound domestic and international theory. Even so, 
I acknowledge that if Rawls included a larger scope of measures aimed at achieving justice in 
international relations to the theory, he could have included a more comprehensive list of 
human rights. Furthermore I argue that Rawls’s theory would benefit from such an 
adjustment. 
Question (2) is approached first by an argument that it is possible to reconcile the Law 
of Peoples with certain aspects of liberal cosmopolitanism. Here, I argue that it is possible to 
combine two key liberal cosmopolitan beliefs with the Law of Peoples. These are: 1. For 
internal political legitimacy to be present in any polity it needs to be organized as a liberal 
democracy. 2. An overarching goal for the foreign policy of a liberal state should be to work 
towards the democratization and liberalization of all presently non-liberal states. After this 
argument is established I propose a theory of international justice that builds on Rawls’s, yet 
involves certain adjustments. This theory affords added normative force to the idea of positive 
duties across borders as well as universal human rights. The argument proceeds by applying 
Rawls’s first-level original position in all the domestic societies in the world and additionally 
by populating the second-level original position with representatives for all these societies. 
These representatives then choose the principles of international justice. The idea of popular 
sovereignty inherent in the use of social contracts helps conceptualize the representatives in 
this second-level original position. I argue that if Rawls is correct in his analysis, the 
representatives in my version will choose the same principles as those Rawls argues in favor 
of. However there will also be certain subtle, yet nonetheless important differences. I think it 
is necessary to adjust Rawls’s theory, because I do not believe that the duty of assistance in 
fact follows from his approach. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 John Rawls and his Theories 
 
The question of who was the second-greatest political philosopher of the twentieth 
century is a worthy topic of debate. The question of who was the greatest is not. 
Offering any name other than John Rawls (1921-2002) could only be an attempt to be 
deliberately provocative (Wolff 2008, 10). 
 
1.1.1 John Rawls 
John Rawls’s status as the most important thinker in political philosophy during the last 
century or so is more or less undisputed. Gerald A. Cohen (2008, 11) regards Rawls’s 
magnum opus – the modestly titled A Theory of Justice (1971) – as one of the three greatest 
works of western political philosophy (along with Plato’s The Republic, and Hobbes’s 
Leviathan). In Anarchy State and Utopia, a book that lays out ideas that are diametrically 
opposed to that of Rawls’s, Robert Nozick (1974, 183) writes: 
 
A Theory of justice is a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in 
political and moral philosophy which has not seen its like since the writings of John 
Stuart Mill, if then.  
 
These are kind words considering they are coming from one of Rawls’s staunchest critics. 
Rawls’s status is not simply defined by how strongly A Theory of Justice resonated, 
and continues to resonate with people who take an interest in political philosophy. Rather, one 
must consider that Rawls reinvigorated the field of political philosophy at a time when 
academic interest was low and “(…) political philosophy had been starved of a grand theory” 
(Wolff 2008, 10). Therefore Rawls is not only important because of the inherent value of his 
theories, but also because of his monumental influence to the field of political philosophy. 
Obviously, these aspects are not unrelated, but they reflect two distinct aspects of why Rawls 
is the greatest political philosopher of the twentieth century. 
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1.1.2 A Brief Summary of Rawls’s Main Work 
Three theories make up Rawls’s main body of work. Each is presented in separate books. 
These books include the already mentioned A theory of justice (1971) (hereafter: TJ), Political 
liberalism (1993) (hereafter: PL) and The Law of Peoples (1999) (hereafter: LP).  
In TJ Rawls makes use of a special type of social contract to argue for a specific set of 
principles of justice. He imagines a hypothetical ”original position” whereby the citizens of a 
polity come together to choose the principles that shall guide the institutions of their society 
(Rawls 1999a, 15-16). The original position is non-historical and purely hypothetical. It is a 
thought experiment. The central feature of this original position is a “veil of ignorance”, 
which hides information the parties might have and that are arbitrary from a moral point of 
view and otherwise would influence the agreement. The participants are thus unaware of their 
values, talents, gender, class, wealth, income, or other similar facts that Rawls believes should 
not influence what principles of justice they would favour (Rawls 1999a, 118-123). The 
parties to the original position are modelled to choose the principles that best reflect their own 
self-interest. Because of the veil of ignorance, each party to the original position has to 
consider how the fortunes of every group in society would come out under the chosen 
principles. This mechanism emerges because all the participants know that once the veil is 
lifted anyone could risk finding themselves among the least advantaged group of society. 
According to Rawls (1999a, 266), this impartial situation would lead to the choosing of the 
following principles of justice to apply to the basic structure of society: 
  
[First principle:] Each person is to have an equal right to the most to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty 
for all 
 
[Second principle:] Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (…), and (b) attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
 
Rawls argues that the first principle takes priority over the second. The first part of the second 
principle, known as the “difference principle”, is the most distinctive. This principle means 
that inequalities that benefit the better off (for instance the talented) are only allowed if these 
inequalities benefit the worst off group. Therefore a society is just if the least advantaged 
group of society are better off than they could have been under alternative arrangements 
(Rawls 1999a, 65). 
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In PL, Rawls argues that the great diversity of reasonable, comprehensive doctrines 
found in democratic society is a permanent feature of democratic societies. Rawls (1993, 36) 
calls this “the fact of reasonable pluralism”. This aspect was not addressed in TJ. Crucially it 
means that “(…) the idea of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness1 is unrealistic” 
(Rawls 1993, xvii) because realizing the principles of TJ is not possible even “(…) under the 
best of foreseeable conditions” (Rawls 1993, xvii). However, despite this pluralism, Rawls 
argues that an overlapping consensus on political principles is possible between reasonable 
citizens2. In order to show this Rawls develops a string of new concepts. PL can be seen as a 
revision of the theory of justice elaborated in TJ. As a result of the fact of reasonable 
pluralism the difference principle is downplayed. However, PL answers “(…) the 
conceptually prior questions of legitimacy and stability(…)” within a liberal society. These 
questions then sets the background for the theory elaborated in TJ (Wenar 2008, section 3). 
 In LP, Rawls (1999b) addresses the topic of international justice. Other political 
thinkers, such as Thomas Pogge (1989), had already developed a global extension of the ideas 
in TJ, including a global version of the difference principle. Yet, in LP Rawls takes a very 
different stance. Instead of globalizing the principles of justice from TJ, Rawls develops a 
theory for the just foreign policy of liberal peoples. His starting point is what he calls a first-
level original position, which set the principles for various liberal domestic societies. The 
principles of this first-level original position are constrained by the concepts put down in PL 
(Rawls 1999b, 30-32; Rawls 1993, 137n). Representatives from the various liberal domestic 
societies (or in Rawls’s words: liberal “peoples”) then convene in a second-level original 
position where they endorse a list of relatively conservative and familiar rules for 
contemporary international relations as the principles of international justice. Amongst the 
principles is a human rights principle that set limits on several of the other principles, in 
addition to a duty of assistance, which seeks to raise burdened societies up to a level that 
enable them to sustain liberal or decent institutions (Rawls 1999b, 37). In addition, Rawls 
(1999b, 59-62) argues that certain non-liberal, “decent” societies deserve to be tolerated in the 
sense that they should not be sanctioned for lack of liberal institutions and be recognised as 
equal participating members of the Society of Peoples3. Part of this argument involves 
                                                
1 Rawls refers to the theory in TJ as “Justice as Fairness”. 
2 Reasonable citizens are willing to propose and abide by mutually acceptable rules, if assured that others will 
also do so (Rawls 1993, 49). 
3 When Rawls uses the term ”Society of Peoples” he means all the peoples that follow the ideals and principles 
of the Law of Peoples (Rawls 1999b, 3). This society might in practice take the form of an idealized version of 
the United Nations (Rawls 1999b, 84). 
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invoking a third original position where representatives for decent peoples endorse the same 
principles for international justice as liberal peoples. Notably, decent societies are not 
democratic and apply restrictions on the freedom of speech. However, they honour a list of 
basic human rights specified by Rawls. 
1.2 The Thesis: Purpose, Plan and Relevance 
1.2.1 Purpose and Problems 
This thesis discusses the Law of Peoples, Rawls’s theory of justice in international relations. 
Its focus is arguably one of the most controversial aspects of the theory, namely its conception 
of human rights. What first and foremost distinguishes Rawls’s list of human rights is that it is 
constrained to a set of urgent rights. At the centre of the controversy lies the fact that Rawls’s 
list of human rights is short. Rawls relegates what is commonly seen as important human 
rights entailing democracy, freedom of speech and non-discrimination as merely liberal 
aspirations. Therefore the main purpose of this thesis is to answer the following question:  
  
(1) Can the conception of human rights Rawls adopts in the Law of Peoples be 
plausibly defended? 
 
 In addition to the part of the thesis that consists of a critical review, there is also a 
constructive ambition. Bearing in mind some of the valid criticisms of Rawls’s conception of 
human rights, I propose an alternative theory of international justice that is potentially 
consistent with all of Rawls’s judgements about tolerance for certain non-liberal peoples and 
list of human rights. The primary aim of this sketched theory is to suggest a way to strengthen 
a weak point of Rawls’s theory, in particular its inability to offer a credible defence for the 
notion of positive duties across societies. The development of this alternative theory answers 
the following question: 
 
(2) Bearing in mind the criticisms of Rawls’s conception of human rights identified in 
the treatment of question (1), how can the Law of Peoples be adjusted in a way that 
affords added normative force to the idea of positive duties across societies? 
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The human rights principle and the duty of assistance are related because once the duty of 
assistance is fulfilled, all previously burdened societies would respect and honour Rawls’s list 
of human rights. However, the duty of assistance is a separate issue from that of human rights. 
To some extent this second question therefore tackles a different issue than the first. 
 The sketched theory combines several of the intuitions of liberal cosmopolitanism 
with the judgements and general approach in LP. A common understanding of the Law of 
Peoples however, is that these two approaches are contradictory at important junctions. 
Liberal cosmopolitans generally argue that the proper way to evaluate principles of 
international justice is by a global original position, in which representatives for all the 
individuals in the world are present. The difference between the two schools of thought that is 
of most relevance for my thesis is the judgements on the place of certain types of non-liberal 
peoples in the theory. An important part of my discussion is to argue that the Law of Peoples 
is not as contradictory in its relation to liberal cosmopolitanism as is commonly understood4. 
The main reasoning behind this claim is that the Law of Peoples is not incompatible with the 
overall goal of a world of only liberal democracies. Furthermore, that the Law of Peoples only 
argues that decent peoples deserve recognitional legitimacy. Rawls’s theory does not say that 
decent peoples are legitimate or just from an internal point of view. 
1.2.2 Plan and Main Arguments  
This thesis treatment of LP depends, in addition to Rawls’s own text, heavily on different 
interpretations of Rawls’s view. In practice this means that question (1) is answered by 
assessing different interpretations of Rawls as well as assessing Rawls’s own text. To the 
extent that these interpretations of Rawls draws on qualitatively different arguments he makes 
or implies, my treatment can be seen as separating the arguments for the conception of human 
rights in LP that I deem implausible from the ones I deem plausible. 
In this thesis I present six main claims, the first four of which can be seen as belonging 
to question (1). Of the remaining two, one arises from question (2). The last claim underlines 
the discussion seen as a whole. These claims are the following: 
 
                                                
4 For an account of some of the differences between the liberal cosmopolitan view and the Law of Peoples, see 
for instance Kok-Chor Tan (2005). 
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i. The prevailing moral beliefs of some domestic societies might, according to Rawls, 
reject liberal ideas such as the belief that all individuals should be treated as free 
and equal. Rawls thinks that some of these non-liberal societies nevertheless 
deserve to be tolerated. Therefore he argues that liberals should not propose rules 
that decent peoples, because of their moral beliefs, would reject. I claim that the 
fact that decent non-liberal peoples might have distorted conceptions about 
morality is not a compelling reason to exclude certain rights from a list of human 
rights. 
 
ii. Samuel Freeman argues that the representatives for liberal peoples in the original 
position should be modelled as exclusively self-interested. From this he argues 
that they would in fact endorse the same list of human rights presented by Rawls. I 
claim that this argument fails at three levels: Firstly, It is in fact unclear that such 
representatives would endorse Rawls’s list of human rights. Secondly, his 
justification for the human rights principle is unappealingly instrumental. Lastly, 
to model the representatives of liberal peoples as uninterested in the human rights 
situation in other societies is implausible. Furthermore, it seems to contradict 
what Rawls himself writes. 
 
iii. Rawls’s list of human rights only contains those rights he believes are 
internationally enforceable. As such they challenge the self-determination of states 
that do not respect them. David A. Reidy argues that it would be unreasonable of 
liberal peoples to agree to a list of internationally enforceable human rights that 
allows coercive liberalization of certain well-ordered non-liberal peoples. 
Although this argument is associated with certain problems, I claim that it gives a 
plausible defence of Rawls’s list of human rights. 
 
iv. Reidy’s defence of Rawls’s list of human rights is contingent on the idea that the 
list should only include rights that in principle warrant coercive sanctions. I 
believe two criticisms can be made against this role for the human rights principle. 
The first argues that it does not reflect the contemporary understanding of the role 
of human rights. The second claims that it confounds issues of ideal and non-ideal 
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theory. I claim that both these criticisms have considerable weaknesses and 
strengths. Their weaknesses are that they both fail as direct criticisms of Rawls’s 
theory. The first seemingly fails to appreciate that Rawls’s theory in fact allows for 
a contemporary understanding of human rights. The second confounds issues of 
domestic and international theory. However their strength is that in combination 
they provide an attractive alternative idea of the role of human rights in a theory 
of international justice. 
 
v. Towards the end of the thesis I sketch an alternative theory of international justice. 
Here I claim that by including representatives of all domestic societies in the 
world in the same original position, modelled as representatives of liberal peoples, 
a theory of international justice can provide added normative force to the duty of 
assistance and human rights. 
 
These claims guide the argumentative structure of the thesis. However, a sixth, 
underlining claim is also of particular relevance: 
 
vi. There are several differences between a liberal cosmopolitan view and Rawls’s 
view. However, I claim that the actual differences are more precisely understood 
and appear less extensive if a distinction is made between internal and 
recognitional legitimacy because, on my understanding, LP is exclusively 
concerned with the question of recognitional legitimacy. 
1.2.3 Relevance of the Thesis 
When addressing issues of global or international justice, LP is a central work for several 
reasons. Rawls’s prominence as an author in political philosophy is an obvious one. The 
hostile reception from writers that sympathize strongly with Rawls’s other works underlines 
its controversy, which again makes it a useful point of departure for discussion. Its position 
somewhere between the doctrine of realism in international relations, and that of liberal 
cosmopolitanism contributes to placing the theory in the eye of the scholarly storm that is the 
debate on international justice (Martin and Reidy 2006, 6-7). 
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(…) The Law of Peoples has become something of a North Star (…) within many 
debates central to contemporary political philosophy. In matters of international justice, 
whatever your understanding of Rawls’s position, and whether you’re with it or against 
it, it is one of the pole stars by which you set the course of your argument (Martin and 
Reidy 2006, 8). 
 
Thus, there should be little doubt regarding the relevance of LP. Whilst the above quote 
is not sufficiently decisive to explain the relevance of this thesis, the status of LP has some 
clear repercussions regarding the relevance of a discussion devoted to the analysis of Rawls’s 
theory’s central elements. My discussion however, is not of interest simply because LP is of 
interest, but for several other reasons. 
Firstly, although some aspects of LP are clearer than others, Rawls’s conception of 
human rights (despite being of fundamental importance to his theory) cannot be considered 
one of these. This makes the existence of somewhat different interpretations of Rawls’s 
position possible at the same time. This thesis considers several different understandings of 
the justification for Rawls’s list of human rights in order to provide a more comprehensive 
answer to the question of whether Rawls’s conception of human rights can be plausibly 
defended. Therefore, not only does this thesis aim to provide new perspective regarding the 
different arguments inherent within the source text, but also on the different interpretations of 
Rawls. The assessment of the varying interpretations surrounding Rawls’s international 
theory in this thesis provides an original contribution to the discourse on Rawlsian human 
rights. 
Secondly, an argument could be made that the most important flaw of Rawls’s theory is 
the failure to provide a convincing defence for the idea of duties that apply across borders. 
Building on this idea I seek to develop an alternative theory of international justice that is 
compatible with the main judgements of the Law of Peoples. Additionally, it will remain 
consistent with the idea of an international social contract between peoples as opposed to one 
between all the individuals in the world. Furthermore the sketched theory can be seen as an 
attempt to reconcile the liberal cosmopolitan position with the Law of Peoples. This 
constructive ambition contributes substantially towards differentiating my discussion of LP. It 
is also arguably the most ambitious part of the thesis.  
 While this thesis is theoretical in its discussions on international justice, the 
discussions should be relevant for the real world as well. The discussion of the role of human 
rights that entail such things as democracy and freedom of speech have taken on even more 
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relevance in light of the revolutionary wave starting in 2010 that has been called “the Arabic 
spring”. Furthermore, what I have called the constructive ambition of this thesis, aims to 
strengthen the normative force behind the claim that rich countries have a moral obligation to 
help all societies that are burdened in various ways. This includes funding to help them out of 
poverty and to help establish governments that effectively work on behalf of the citizens and 
not to enrich the wielders of power. Since current international practices inherent in the 
international economic system, trade relations or loaning practices might contribute rather 
than alleviate burdens on poor countries, a part of the moral duty to help these countries is to 
reform such practices in a way that is fully compatible with the duty to help.  
Noam Chomsky and Thomas Pogge (2011) argue that our generation have failed in the 
struggle for global justice. Furthermore, that while economic growth has accelerated with the 
globalization of markets after the end of the cold war, this has not benefitted the poor. I fact it 
seems to have increased the hardships on the already worst off groups. The ever-increasing 
number of chronically malnourished in the world is a testament to this negative development. 
To elaborate on the moral duty on rich liberal societies to stop and to turn this development 
should be an important aspect of political theory that focuses on the international political 
sphere. It is on the back of these considerations that I hope the theory of international justice 
that I will go on to sketch in chapter 11 is of more than merely theoretical relevance. 
1.3 Cosmopolitanism 
On the issue of international justice, different versions of cosmopolitanism are the most 
obvious alternatives to Rawls’s conception. Pogge (1992, 48-49) writes that all cosmopolitans 
share three beliefs. The first belief is that “(…) the ultimate units of concern are human beings 
(…)”. Nations or states are only of moral concern indirectly. The second belief is that “(…) 
the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally. The third 
belief is that “Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone – not only for their 
compatriots”. 
 There are different strands of cosmopolitanism. Moral cosmopolitanism holds that 
everyone is required to respect each other’s status as ultimate units of moral concern. Legal 
(or institutional) cosmopolitanism is committed to some form of cosmopolitan global republic 
were all persons in the world have equivalent legal rights and duties as citizens (Pogge 1992, 
49).  
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The Law of Peoples seems to presuppose that peoples are of moral concern and so it 
straightaway breaks with a central belief of cosmopolitanism. In practice, cosmopolitans 
generally criticize Rawls for mainly two things: Firstly, the lack of a more comprehensive 
principle of global distributive justice than the duty of assistance. Secondly, they criticize 
Rawls for his arguments in favour of toleration of decent non-liberal peoples. This toleration 
means that the ideal Society of Peoples, according to Rawls, might be populated by any 
number of non-liberal decent societies. This thesis focuses exclusively on the latter of these 
criticisms. I will argue that the Law of Peoples is not incompatible with liberal 
cosmopolitanism. What I mean specifically is that Rawls’s theory is compatible with the 
overall goal of a world of only liberal democracies. Furthermore, but with certain limitations, 
the idea that this goal should guide the foreign policy of liberal peoples. In addition it is 
compatible with the belief political legitimacy demands liberal institutions. Liberal 
cosmopolitanism might also involve other judgements that are more difficult to reconcile with 
the Law of Peoples. These are not discussed. 
1.4 Aspects Outside of the Scope of this Thesis 
The topics of LP entail many debates and my discussion touches on some of these. Certain 
debates I do not address however. Of these, two related issues are particularly relevant. 
Therefore, a brief account will be provided below. 
The first is the argument that international justice should be addressed through a social 
contract between states (or peoples) instead of one between all the individuals in the world.5 
Rawls appears not to give much of an explanation for why he chooses to theorize in terms 
peoples instead of individuals. However, by elaborating on what Rawls writes, several others 
have suggested the underlining reasons for this approach. Wenar (2004, 273) argues that 
Rawls has to draw on the global public culture to specify legitimate principles of global 
justice, and that this public culture is dominated by ideas of how states should interact, and 
not how individuals in different polities should relate to each other. Reidy (2007, 209) argues 
that Rawls needs to theorize in terms of peoples, because in the real world we live in, there 
exists different peoples that owe each other recognition and respect. 
The second is the claim that in an original position between peoples, the representatives 
would choose the set of conservative principles of the Law of Peoples as the principles of 
                                                
5 According to Pogge (1994, 197) variants of this approach has been suggested, in addition to himself, by David 
Richards, Thomas Scanlon, Brian Barry and Charles Beitz. 
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international justice. Perhaps the biggest question raised here concerns the duty of assistance. 
This principle only seeks to raise all peoples up to a certain standard where a well-ordered 
society can be sustained. The question of whether this is a superior principle of distributive 
justice for the international arena than any other falls outside the scope of my discussion. The 
most notable of the alternatives to this principle is perhaps an international version of the 
difference principle. However other principles which lack the “target” and “cut-off point”6 of 
the duty of assistance, could possibly be conceived of. It seems likely that the choice of the 
duty of assistance is strongly related to the choice of theorizing in terms of peoples. The basis 
of this assumption is that we might plausibly assume that peoples and individuals have 
different aims. Although Philip Pettit (2006) questions the logic behind the selection of the 
duty of assistance, he argues that Rawls’s “ontology of peoples” explains the differing 
principles of justice between the domestic and global setting. Freeman (2006b, 60) argues that 
Rawls does not believe the basic structure of international relations gives rise to principles of 
distributive justice that does not have the cut-off point associated with the duty of assistance. 
In LP, Rawls (1999b, 117) writes that one of the reasons he rejects a resource redistribution 
principle is that he believes that “(…) the crucial element in how a country fares is its political 
culture (…) and not the level of its resources”. This means that “(…) the arbitrariness of the 
distribution of natural resources causes no difficulty”. 
These two points are related because it seems unlikely that a principle like the duty of 
assistance would be selected in favour of global version of the difference principle in an 
original position where all the individuals in the world are represented. The reasoning being 
that there seems to be little reason for why this cosmopolitan approach would produce 
fundamentally different results than those reached in domestic theory. However, from this it 
does not follow that the duty of assistance is the most proper distributive justice principle if 
we favour an international original position over a cosmopolitan. Pogge (1994, 199-205) for 
instance, argues that a global resource tax system is a superior principle. In my discussion, 
however, I assume that the duty of assistance is the proper way to deal with questions of 
                                                
6 That the principle has a target and a cut-off point means that once it reaches its goal (that a burdened society 
becomes well-ordered) no more assistance is required. This means that in a world of only liberal peoples (or in a 
world of only liberal or decent peoples), there should be no tax on the rich states simply to benefit the poor 
states. 
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international distributive justice7. Furthermore I assume that Rawls, in LP, is right to populate 
the original position with representatives of peoples instead of individuals. 
1.5 Method  
Before I embark on my discussion of LP, the question of how one can make successful 
normative arguments arises.  
In normative ethics, as opposed to for instance the natural sciences, there are arguably 
no approximately definite standards to which the truth of a normative judgement might be 
assessed. Logic is obviously an important factor when dealing with any arguments. The 
conclusions must follow from the premises and the arguments must be consistent without 
depending on logical fallacies. However, a great deal of logically consistent normative 
arguments can be made. I might state the premise that no life form has sufficient value to 
warrant any claims to a certain type of treatment8. From this I can make the political 
normative judgement that there is nothing wrong in how the wielders of power in North 
Korea act towards the people residing within its borders. However, neither the conclusion nor 
the premise in this logically consistent statement fits well with the moral convictions of most 
persons. In the absence of the harder types of evidence provided in physics or in statistical 
analysis, our own reflections, thus, becomes important to normative reasoning. 
While our own reflections about justice and morality should play some role in assessing 
normative arguments, exactly how this should be done, and whether it can be done in a 
systematic or even meaningful way is a matter of dispute. One way of going about doing it is 
by using Rawls’s reflective equilibrium approach (Rawls 1999a, 42-45). I think this method 
has some promise partly because it formalizes and reflects how many people tend to think 
about normative arguments. In the discussion I will refrain from making more than implied 
references to it. However, it provides a background to understand how I approach normative 
arguments. 
 
                                                
7 This assumption should not be confused with the assumption that the representatives in Rawls’s second-level 
original position actually would select the duty of assistance. Rawls explains in some detail why the duty of 
assistance, with its cut-off point in particular, is to be preferred over cosmopolitan egalitarian principles. 
However, his justifications for why the duty of assistance would actually be selected in his international original 
position are unconvincing. 
8 One could of course interject here and say that I am stating a false premise. How we know that any premise in 
moral philosophy is false, however, is exactly the issue at hand. 
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For Rawls how justified one is in one’s political convictions depends on how close one 
is to achieving reflective equilibrium. (…) [I]n reflective equilibrium one's specific 
political judgements (e.g., “slavery is unjust,” “imprisonment without trial is unjust”) 
support one's more general political convictions (e.g., “all citizens have certain basic 
rights”) which support one's very abstract beliefs about oneself and one's world (e.g., 
“all citizens are free and equal”). Viewed from the opposite direction, in reflective 
equilibrium one's abstract beliefs explain one's more general convictions, which in turn 
explain one's specific judgements. (Wenar 2008, section 2.4) 
 
Therefore reflective equilibrium can be defined as a state of balance among a set of beliefs on 
different levels. The state of balance is only half of the point however. As a method, the 
careful back and forth deliberation of beliefs on every level move the different beliefs in the 
direction of a reflective equilibrium. Sometimes we might adjust our judgements if we are 
presented with an especially intuitively plausible theory, and sometimes our judgements leave 
us to reject or, if possible, adjust the theory (Rawls 1999a, 42-43). 
A practical example of how to use the idea of reflective equilibrium might be helpful 
here. For instance, assume that I believe freedom is the only relevant parameter for justice. 
From this I make the political judgement that a state should only interfere in a person’s life 
when such interference is needed to stop that person from interfering in some other person’s 
life9. However, I also believe that no person should be enslaved, even under consent. These 
beliefs may conflict, because in a society that follows the idea of non-interference, where 
there is no tax and no redistribution, some person could become so poor that they have to 
choose between, formally or de facto, selling themselves as slaves or suffer starvation or 
perhaps even die. Assuming this is true, I am left with several choices. I could discard my 
belief that no person should be enslaved. Another possibility is to adjust my belief about non-
interference. Assuming that even consenting slaves, or people under similar hardship are not 
free in any meaningful understanding of the word, I can instead state that the political system 
that best maximizes freedom is the most just. Then, on more reflection, I might discover new 
beliefs potentially conflicting with this new statement. Again I might make some adjustment. 
By carefully applying this method, I might at one point give up the theory that freedom is the 
only relevant parameter for justice. Hopefully I will at some point achieve something close to 
the desired balance between the beliefs I have on different levels. 
Reflective equilibrium provides nothing approaching definite truths on normative 
question however; because once we move beyond the most obvious aspects of normative 
                                                
9 My description here is a sketched representation of common libertarian views, elaborated on by for instance 
Nozick (1974). 
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consensus (If indeed there are any) there will be reasonably widespread differences in 
intuitions. In the end any normative argument must be evaluated by considering its full logical 
and normative implications as well as the empirical premises it might rest on. Moreover, by 
making careful judgements on whether these implications are intuitively implausible, in some 
way conflicts with what we believe to be empirical facts, or are logically inconsistent. It is the 
act of clarifying all the implications and premises of normative arguments and the act of 
making careful judgements on them I take to be the general meaning of doing analysis in the 
field of normative political theory. 
While logic and beliefs about empirical facts might be easier to express more certainty 
around, the deeming of something as intuitively implausible will always be the cause of 
debate. However, when all the implications of an argument are clarified, it is easier to make a 
reasonable judgement10. In the classic science fiction novel Starship Troopers (1959) by 
Robert A. Heinlein, moral philosophy has (given the genre perhaps surprisingly) a central 
role. Moral philosophy is taught in classrooms as an exact science, on par with mathematics. 
There appears to be perfect consensus on the premises which moral truths rests upon. 
Therefore it is telling, that the plot mainly revolves around an interplanetary war between 
humans and giant bugs. The idea of a consensus around normative judgements appears more 
at home in science fiction than it is in the real world. Some assumptions and some intuitions 
are unlikely to reach anything resembling universal agreement in the foreseeable future. 
Furthermore, consensus is perhaps not a precise judge of truth. 
 I will at several points in my discussion appeal, both implicitly and explicitly, to 
normative intuitions. When I do, it is with the hope that at least the people who relate to the 
general approach and conclusions in Rawls’s theories would, on reflection, tend to agree with 
these intuitions. No doubt some (perhaps even most) would nevertheless disagree. The 
likelihood of complete agreement remains low. However, with more systematically construed 
positions, the discussion becomes easier and hopes of reaching a consensus increase. 
Furthermore, while consensus would be nice, it is also nice to know exactly what the 
disagreement is about. Consequently, even if it is impossible to fully justify some normative 
judgements, normative analysis can have a great deal of value. 
                                                
10 It is worth noting that clarification is no trivial task. Making an illuminating observation about an implication 
of an argument or theory, or making an important distinction, might require great reflective effort and creativity, 
and change how an argument is looked upon. 
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1.6 Structure 
There is a need to briefly go through how the rest of this thesis is structured. Chapter 2 
provides a summary of the main points of LP. Chapter 3 gives an outline of Rawls’s list of 
human rights. Chapter 4 considers an interpretation of Rawls that says that the list of human 
rights must be acceptable to societies that reject liberal beliefs such as the idea that all 
individuals should be treated as free and of equal moral worth. Chapter 5 discusses an account 
of Rawls’s fundamental norm of legitimacy, which entails that there is political legitimacy in 
decent societies and therefore such societies should be tolerated. Chapter 6 discusses 
Freeman’s justification of Rawlsian human rights, which is grounded in the idea that the 
representatives in the second-level original position should be modelled as exclusively 
rational self-interested. Chaper 7 takes a closer look at Rawls’s arguments for toleration of 
decent peoples and identifies Rawls’s valuing of the self-determination of a people as central. 
Chapter 8 discusses Reidy’s proposed justification of Rawlsian human rights. Reidy argues 
that it would be unreasonable of liberal peoples to endorse a human rights principle that 
legitimizes the use of forceful intervention11 in decent societies. Chapter 9 discusses the 
assumption that the human rights principle should take on the role of specifying when forceful 
intervention is in principle allowed. Chapter 10 argues that liberal cosmopolitan views are not 
as contradictory to the Law of Peoples as some suggest. In Chapter 11 an alternative theory of 
international justice is sketched. This theory provides added normative force to the idea of 
positive duties across borders. Furthermore, it combines some liberal cosmopolitan intuitions 
with the general approach and main judgements in LP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 By ”forceful intervention” Rawls (1999b, 80) means primarily diplomatic, economic or military sanctions. I 
will use the terms ”forceful intervention” and ”coercive sanctioning” synonymously. 
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2 The Law of Peoples 
In the introduction I gave a brief account of LP. In this chapter I give a fuller introduction of 
all the central features of the theory presented in this book.  
In LP Rawls develops what he believes are the ideals and principles of a liberal foreign 
policy (Rawls 1999b, 10). He does this by envisioning a hypothetical social contract in a 
fashion that is similar to how he arrives at principles of justice for a domestic society. Rawls 
uses the term “Society of Peoples” to describe the group of peoples that follow the ideals and 
principles of the Law of Peoples (Rawls 1999b, 3).12 
2.1 The Fact of Reasonable Pluralism 
The Law of Peoples extends several of the ideas in PL to the international sphere. Central to 
this theory for a liberal domestic society is what Rawls calls “the fact of reasonable 
pluralism”. This is the fact that the diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines found in 
democratic society is not something that is going to disappear. Rather it is something 
permanent to modern democracy (Rawls 1993, 36). The fact of reasonable pluralism is also 
central to LP, although in a slightly different version. For my purposes there is a need to look 
closely at Rawls’s definition in PL: 
 
[I]t is the fact that among the views that develop [under free institutions] are a diversity 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  These are the doctrines that reasonable citizens 
affirm and that political liberalism must address. They are not the upshot of self- and 
class interest, or of peoples’ understandable tendency to view the political world from a 
limited standpoint. Instead they are in part the work of free practical reason within the 
framework of free institutions. Thus, although historical doctrines are not, of course, the 
work of free reason alone, the fact of reasonable pluralism is not an unfortunate 
condition of human life (Rawls 1993, 36-37). 
 
In his international theory, Rawls uses an analogue to the reasonable pluralism of his 
domestic theory. Since there might be some non-liberal domestic societies that are decent 
enough to warrant the recognition as equal participating members of the Society of Peoples, 
toleration of such peoples in international theory might be seen as an international extension 
                                                
12 See footnote 3. 
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of the use of reasonable pluralism in domestic theory (Rawls 1999b, 18, 40). The two cases 
are, however, not strictly speaking analogues. First, decent peoples are not reasonable, since 
they do not treat their members as free and equal (Rawls 1999b, 74, 83). Second, that some 
domestic societies are not going to be liberal, does not seem to be something one would 
consider a permanent fact of human life. The need to accommodate an international theory 
according to Rawls’s international version of reasonable pluralism, then, is not as pressing as 
in domestic theory. Rawls seems to acknowledge this, evident via the use of the term 
“similarly”, instead of “analogously” (Rawls, 1999b, 59). He also argues for the belief on the 
part of liberal societies that decent societies are capable of reforming in a liberal direction, 
which indicates that he does not hold that the existence of decent peoples have the same kind 
of permanency as the case may be with reasonable pluralism in a domestic society (Rawls 
1999b, 62). 
2.2 The Principles of International Justice 
The principles of the Law of Peoples are the following: 
 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence is to be 
respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other 
than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (Rawls 1999b, 37). 
 
Similarly to how principles are arrived at in domestic theory, Rawls argues that the 
representatives would endorse these principles when set in an original position under a veil of 
ignorance. As mentioned earlier, in international theory it is not persons that are represented 
in the original position(s), but peoples. The term people, is used by Rawls signifying an 
idealized version of states. On a general level they are synonymous to states, they are set 
within the international system of states, and they constitute a domestic society like a state. 
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The representatives in the original position(s) are only presented the list of principles 
above. They are not offered any alternatives. The debate in the original position is therefore 
only concerned with the interpretation of the different principles (Rawls 1999b, 40). Rawls 
gives no reason for why alternatives are not considered. However, he states that he does not 
believe the representatives would want to remove any principles nor add any. Concerning 
justice in international relations, he states that he believes these principles to be superior to 
any others (Rawls 1999b, 41). This, of course, might be the reason why they are selected. 
However, the lack of alternatives is puzzling. One plausible interpretation is that Rawls does 
not think that any other principles are viable even as alternatives, because regarding how 
peoples relate to justice in their relations, no other principles are conceived of. As mentioned, 
Rawls also thinks that given the nature of peoples, these principles, better than any others, 
reflect international justice. 
2.3 Toleration of Decent Peoples 
Rawls uses the international original position twice. First for liberal peoples, because it is, 
after all, the principles of a liberal foreign policy Rawls wants to elaborate on. The Law of 
Peoples, however, holds that decent non-liberal viewpoints exist, and that questions 
concerning to what extent non-liberal peoples should be tolerated is “an essential question of 
liberal foreign policy” (Rawls 1999b, 10). 
 
The reason we go on to consider the point of view of decent peoples is not to prescribe 
principles of justice for them, but to assure ourself that the ideals and principles of the 
foreign policy of a liberal people are also reasonable from a decent nonliberal point of 
view. (Rawls 1999b, 10) 
  
The reasoning, then, behind extending a second original position to decent peoples, is 
that they are worthy of the recognitional legitimacy that is membership of the Society of 
Peoples. Whether, internally, the wielders of power in such societies are morally justified in 
enforcing their laws, seems to be another question. However this distinction will be discussed 
in greater depth further into this text. Here I only note that while Rawls argues that decent 
peoples are worthy of being tolerated as equal participating members of the Society of 
Peoples (Recognitional legitimacy) he does not say that they meet any standards of legitimacy 
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from an internal point of view (Internal legitimacy)13. In fact he seems to imply the opposite, 
by observing that decent societies are not internally just (Rawls 1999b, 62)14. 
2.4 Characteristics of Five Different Domestic 
Societies 
Rawls (1999b, 4) distinguishes between five types of domestic societies. These are reasonable 
liberal peoples, decent peoples, outlaw states, societies burdened by unfavourable conditions 
and benevolent absolutisms. As is revealed by Rawls’s choice of words in the above 
distinction, only some societies qualify as peoples. As noted earlier, the term “people” is 
therefore not only descriptive, as the case might be with the term state, but it also contains 
moral content. A people, as opposed to a state, does not have an aggressive foreign policy, 
and there are certain restrictions on how a people might deal with its members (Rawls 1999b, 
25-26). Only the first two categories of domestic societies seem to qualify as peoples. 
 According to Rawls (1999b, 23-24), liberal peoples have three basic features. Firstly, a 
liberal people have a reasonably just constitutional democratic government. This means that 
the government is under the political and electoral control of the people, and protects their 
fundamental interests. Secondly, they have citizens united by common sympathies. Thirdly, 
liberal peoples have a moral nature, which requires a firm attachment to a political moral 
conception of right and justice. 
 Decent non-liberal peoples are not internally just from a liberal perspective because 
they fail to treat all persons in society as truly free and equal (Rawls 1999b, 60). A decent 
non-liberal people may have its institutions organized around a single comprehensive 
doctrine. The state religion might for instance be the ultimate authority within society (Rawls 
1999b, 74). Furthermore, minorities may be excluded from the right to hold higher political or 
judicial offices. They are not however, stripped of most civic rights (Rawls 1999b, 76). 
Decent peoples do not have aggressive aims in their foreign policy. Furthermore, they allow 
for dissent; a factor Rawls thinks could contribute to reform over time (Rawls 1999b, 61). The 
members are allowed a part in the making of political decisions by the use of a consultation 
                                                
13 The very useful distinction between internal and recognitional legitimacy is taken from Allen Buchanan’s 
book Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination (2004). The distinction is elaborated on by Buchanan in 
chapters five and six of that book. 
14 One could perhaps object that this point is dependent on the interchanging use of the terms justice and 
legitimacy. This is a valid objection because internal legitimacy might be present even when laws are unjust. 
Although it seems natural to assume that they are connected, the two terms are not synonymous. I discuss this 
issue in chapter 5. 
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hierarchy or its equivalent (Rawls 1999b, 61). This is far from a democratic institution, but 
seems to be an instrument for securing feedback between members and the wielders of power. 
Through such an institution, all groups in society are represented, and the government 
consults these representatives (71-2). 
The system of law in a decent society must follow a common good idea of justice that 
takes into account what it sees as the fundamental interests of everyone in society (65, 67). It 
seems that for such a criterion to be fulfilled, a reasonably large proportion of the individuals 
within the society must subscribe to this common good idea of justice. However, it also seems 
likely that there would exist a significant proportion that object to laws designed to restrict 
free speech, deny them access to certain positions and the lack of democratic institutions.  
Lastly, a decent people respects and honours Rawls’s chosen list of human rights. 
Rawls is widely criticized for not demanding more than his outline of decency for toleration. 
At the heart of this criticism lies Rawls’s list of human rights. 
Decent peoples may come in many different institutional forms. Rawls mainly 
discusses decent hierarchical peoples. Such peoples have in common that they are 
associationist in form. This means that the members are viewed as belonging to different 
groups and “(…) each group is represented in the legal system by a body in a decent 
consultation hierarchy” (Rawls 1999b, 64). Rawls (1999b, 75-78) lets a hypothetical example 
of such a society, called “Kazanistan”, illustrate that a certain type of Islamic political society 
is consistent with this type of decent society. Presumably he does this to relate the abstract 
idea of a decent hierarchical society to the real world. It may be that such a society has similar 
institutional features to the contemporary state of Iran. However, Iran does not respect 
Rawls’s list of human rights (UN News Service 2011). Furthermore Iran could perhaps also 
be said to have an aggressive foreign policy. Another state, which seems to bare similarities to 
a decent hierarchical people, is China. Although there might be several issues here as well. In 
any case, the question of whether or not Rawls would think China or Oman qualifies as a 
decent people is not one I wish to pursue. Moreover, it is irrelevant for Rawls whether decent 
peoples exist or not. His only claim is that if they exist, liberal peoples should tolerate them. 
In addition to well-ordered decent or liberal peoples, Rawls describes outlaw states 
and burdened societies. The former type of regimes might engage in war, if war is seen to 
advance the interests of the regime (Rawls 1999b, 90). The latter signifies societies that are 
burdened with unfavourable historical, social and economic circumstances, which make 
achieving a well-ordered society very difficult (Rawls 1999b, 90, 106). Rawls uses little time 
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on benevolent absolutisms, other than noting that they honour human rights, but are not 
decent or well-ordered because they deny their members a role in the political processes 
(Rawls 1999b, 63). It might be unlikely that such regimes exist or could exist, however the 
definition of such regimes helps with narrowing-in on the concept of decent societies. It 
becomes clear that even societies that can honour all the principles of the Law of Peoples 
should not always be tolerated. The members of a society must also have a part in political 
decisions for it to be considered decent and worthy of equal membership of the Society of 
Peoples. 
2.5 Just War and the Duty of Assistance 
While decent and liberal peoples are included in ideal theory, burdened and outlaw states as 
well as benevolent absolutisms are addressed in non-ideal theory. Outlaw states that violate 
human rights, might be met by coercive intervention by use of diplomatic, economic or, in 
grave cases, military sanctions (Rawls 1999b, 81). Outlaw states acting aggressively, might be 
subjected to the use of war. The members of the Society of Peoples have a right to use war in 
self-defence (Rawls 1999b, 91). Rawls outlines a “just war doctrine” with six basic principles. 
Among these principles is that the aim of a just war is a “(…) just and lasting peace among 
peoples, and especially with the people’s present enemy” (Rawls 1999b, 94). Furthermore, 
that just war is only waged against expansionist states that threaten the security and freedom 
of well-ordered peoples (Rawls 1999b, 94). 
Burdened societies are to be supported in their development with the goal of 
sustainment of decent or liberal institutions. This is specified by the duty of assistance: 
 
(…) [I]ts aim is to help burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs 
reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members of the Society of well-
ordered Peoples. This defines the “target” of assistance. After it is achieved, further 
assistance is not required, even though the now well-ordered society may still be 
relatively poor. 
 
The only reason Rawls provides regarding why the duty of assistance would be 
endorsed in the original position is his stipulation that one of the characteristics of liberal and 
decent peoples is their concern of extending the Society of Peoples to all domestic societies 
(Rawls 1999b, 89). Rawls (1999b, 29) also writes that one of the interests of liberal peoples is 
to try “(…) to assure reasonable justice (…) for all peoples”. Rawls assumes this concern is 
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strong enough to warrant the inclusion of the duty of assistance among the selected principles. 
This seems a rather feeble defence for such an important and progressive part of Rawls’s 
theory. The problem for the duty of assistance principle is that the interests of burdened 
societies are not represented in the original position. This means that Rawls has to rely on the 
assumption of the benevolence of liberal (and decent) peoples in order for the duty of 
assistance to be selected. However, there seems to be little evidence that this level of 
benevolence is a significant feature of developed societies15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 The problems related to the selection of the duty of assistance is addressed further in sections 3.5 and 11.1. 
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3 Rawlsian Human Rights: An outline 
In this chapter I outline Rawls’s conception of human rights in LP. First I note the centrality 
of human rights in Rawls’s international theory. Second, I note the lack of a clearly stated 
justification for his proposed list of human rights. Third, I give a quick overview of the 
content, nature and role of Rawlsian human rights. Fourth, I comment on the relationship 
between the human rights principle and the duty of assistance and discuss how broadly the 
latter principle could be interpreted. Lastly I show that Rawls’s use of an original position 
argument to derive the principles of international justice, fails to provide any added normative 
force to the idea of universal human rights as well as duties across societies. 
3.1 The Centrality of Human Rights in Rawls’s 
Framework 
The sixth of the eight principles of the Law of Peoples reads: “Peoples are to honor human 
rights” (Rawls 1999b, 37). The principles, as Rawls (1999b, 37) points out are “(…) familiar 
and traditional principles of justice among free and democratic peoples”. In light of their 
familiarity, none of the principles are especially controversial. Except perhaps, again as 
pointed out by Rawls (1999b, 37n), the duty of assistance to peoples living under 
unfavourable conditions. This is not to say that Rawls’s decision to present exactly these, 
seemingly conservative rules of international relations, as the chosen principles for global or 
international justice, is uncontroversial. Critics, perhaps of the more cosmopolitan persuasion, 
might both dismiss the principles chosen in the original position as too restrictive. For 
instance lacking a proper parallel to the domestic difference principle, as well as disagree with 
the decision to theorize in terms of states and not individuals, in the first place16. 
Be that as it may, the most common controversy with these familiar principles, upon 
the acceptance of their presence, is the means by which some are interpreted. This way, the 
human rights principle becomes important, as it forms the restrictions on the other principles. 
This way, the role of human rights permeates Rawls’s framework. First it forms part of the 
“(…) limits on, a government’s internal sovereignty” (Rawls 1999b, 27). This means that the 
list of human rights place the limits on what the international community should accept that a 
government could subject its members to. Rights to independence and self-determination, 
                                                
16 For an account of the first criticism see for instance Thomas Pogge (1994). For an account of the second, see 
for instance Simon Caney (2002). 
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which follow from the first principle, is qualified by the honouring of human rights. Second 
and also related to the first, human rights make qualifications on the fourth principle of the 
Law of Peoples, which states that: “Peoples are to observe a duty of non-interference” (Rawls 
1999b, 27). Exceptions on this principle, such as measures involving diplomatic, economic, or 
in grave cases, military sanctions are only ruled out against societies that honour human 
rights. Similarly, the right to self-defence, specified in the fifth principle, is only a right for 
non-aggressive, human rights-honouring societies (Rawls 1999b, 92). 
3.2 Rawlsian Human Rights: Thin Justifications 
Since human rights are so important to Rawls’s theory, one would naturally expect that Rawls 
would go into great detail on their nature and justification. The rights Rawls considers proper 
human rights, does not include seemingly important rights such as equal political 
participation, freedom of speech and non-discrimination (Rawls 1999b, 65, 80n). Instead he 
calls such rights liberal aspirations (Rawls 1999b, 80n). Given the centrality of the human 
rights that are seen by Rawls as proper, and the significance of the cut he makes between 
proper and non-proper human rights, a thorough justification is seemingly essential. 
Somewhat surprisingly Rawls remains both vague and brief on the subject. A much-cited 
paragraph in the literature surrounding LP, which point to the difficulty of writing about 
Rawls’s view on and use of human rights is the following comment from Rawls (1999b, 27):  
 
At this point I leave aside the many difficulties of interpreting these rights and limits, 
and take their general meaning and tendency as clear enough. 
 
Furthermore, Rawls never attempts to explain why for instance freedom of speech is merely 
an aspiration, instead of a proper human right. Since Rawls is elusive on his justifications, his 
position sometimes becomes difficult to criticize, because it is difficult to approach.  
Now, Rawls is not completely silent on the matter, so the prospects of writing about 
human rights in LP is not as bleak as I perhaps have made it out to be. However, I find it 
relevant to make these comments before I proceed because it partly explains why my 
discussion is as focused on the interpretations of Rawls in the literature surrounding LP, as it 
is on LP itself. Since Rawls is at best ambiguous on his justifications, it becomes necessary, 
when discussing Rawlsian human rights, to at least in part use different interpretations of 
Rawls as a basis for the discussion. Furthermore, it is presumably because of the lack of a 
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clear justification for his conception of human rights, that the literature surrounding LP 
include various attempts, at elaborating on Rawlsian human rights on Rawls’s behalf.17 
3.3 Rawlsian Human Rights: A Quick Overview 
The Law of Peoples endorses a somewhat narrow, or basic, doctrine of human rights. Rawls 
(1999b, 78) holds that human rights are different from the political rights that citizens have in 
a reasonable constitutional democratic regime. Instead they “(…) express a special class of 
urgent rights (…)” (Rawls, 1999b, 79). At one point Rawls (1999b, 65) lists the following as 
human rights: 
  
(…) [T]he rights to life (to means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom 
from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of 
conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to property (personal property); 
and to formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar 
cases be treated similarly). 
 
Note here that while these Rawlsian human rights endorse freedom of conscience, 
those that believe otherwise than the wielders of power might be discriminated against 
holding certain positions. Rawls (1999b, 65n) calls this “(…) liberty of conscience, though 
not an equal liberty”. In fact, there are no human rights, according to Rawls, protecting 
against various forms of discrimination on grounds of for instance nationality, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, gender, or race (Buchanan 2006, 151). 
 The distinction between the typical rights of citizens in constitutional democracies and 
rights that Rawls allows as human rights in the Law of Peoples are made clearer by a brief 
discussion in a footnote that I have already made references to. Here, by reference to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Rawls (1999b, 80n) makes a distinction 
between human rights proper, and what he calls statements of liberal aspirations. He writes 
that article 3 to 18 in this declaration might be seen as human rights proper. Notably omitted 
from Rawls’s list of human rights then, is a right to democratic participation, freedom of 
speech, and non-discrimination. 
A look at the index in LP reveals the following points made by Rawls on the nature of 
human rights of the Law of Peoples: 1. They do not depend on a comprehensive or liberal 
doctrine. 2. They consist of a special class of urgent rights. 3. They are universal in reach. 4. 
                                                
17 In this thesis I discuss primarily such contributions from Buchanan, Freeman, Wenar and Reidy. 
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They are necessary to any system of cooperation. 5. They are not the same as liberal 
democratic rights. Furthermore, Rawls (1999b, 80) writes that his class of human rights have 
the following three roles:  
 
1. Their fulfilment is a necessary condition of the decency of a society’s political 
institutions and of its legal order (…). 
2. Their fulfilment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other 
peoples, for example, by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in grave cases by 
military force. 
3. They set a limit to the pluralism among peoples. 
 
 These roles will be central to this thesis because the justification of Rawls’s list of 
human rights must be seen in relation to its role. 
3.4 Some Comments on the Duty of Assistance 
As mentioned at one point in the introduction, the duty of assistance is related to the human 
rights principle. The reason for the connection is that the minimal level the duty of assistance 
seeks to raise burdened societies to (decency), is one where Rawls’s list of human rights is 
respected and honoured. This way the duty of assistance (at least indirectly) protects human 
rights. 
An often criticised aspect of contemporary liberal countries’ foreign policy is their 
frequent exploitation of less developed countries in order to enrich themselves18. Pogge 
(2006, 221) argues that one of the main differences between his view and Rawls’s is that 
Rawls in effect criticizes contemporary rich liberal countries for failing to fulfil their positive 
duties of assistance, while Pogge on the other hand: 
 
(…) [C]riticize rich liberal societies (and the ruling elites of many poor countries) for 
massively violating their negative duties not to harm by imposing a global institutional 
order that foreseeably causes avoidable human suffering of unimaginable proportions 
(Pogge, 2006, 221). 
 
Although I sympathise with Pogge’s statement I wonder if his interpretation of Rawls is too 
harsh19. If the current global institutional order is as unjust and exploitative of the least 
advantaged societies as Pogge claims, then it seems to be incompatible with the duty of 
                                                
18 See for instance Pogge (2002). 
19 Freeman (2006a, 249-251) makes a similar observation. 
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assistance. Rawls does not say much about fairness concerning the many aspects of trade 
relations and the international economic system. However, if we assume that all rich liberal 
societies were to accept the duty of assistance with its goal of helping burdened societies to 
the level of well-ordered (a level where there is no substantial human suffering), then they 
would have to do something as well with the harmful global institutional order (assuming 
Pogge is right that it is harmful). The duty of assistance would be a hollow and largely 
ineffective principle if rich countries are allowed to give with one hand and take with the 
other the way Pogge describes. If the duty of assistance indeed implies negative duties as well 
as positive duties, then Pogge’s position is perhaps not as far from Rawls’s as he assumes. 
I have already noted briefly that Rawls does not provide a compelling justification for 
the inclusion of the duty of assistance amongst the principles. Part of my argument for this 
claim is elaborated on in the next section.20 
3.5 Human Rights, the Duty of Assistance and the 
Original Position: Absence of Added Normative 
Force 
When presented with Rawls’s original position-derived principles of international justice, two 
fundamental questions concerning the human rights principle tends to open up. Curiously they 
lead the discussion in entirely contrasting directions. The first raises the issue of why the list 
of rights is not more extensive. The second however, questions why a list of human rights is 
selected at all. 
Unsurprisingly, a continual criticism of Rawls’s list of human rights is the argument 
that they should include more rights. By reflecting on the original position argument that 
Rawls uses to derive his principles of international justice, one might say that since liberal 
peoples decide the principles of the Law of Peoples, it seems likely that they would agree on a 
more liberal list of human rights. In Rawls’s domestic theories however, representatives of 
individuals are modelled as rational and self-interested (Rawls 1999a, 123). What principles 
then, we might ask, would follow from an original position populated by representatives of 
peoples only concerned with pursuing their own rational interests?21 M. Victoria Costa (2005, 
51-52) argues that given the self-interests of peoples, many of the principles in the Law of 
                                                
20 I elaborate more on this point in chapter 11. 
21 Freeman’s defence of Rawls relies on this understanding on the use of an international original position to 
derive the principles of international justice. This defence is discussed in chapter 6. 
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Peoples are plausible. Except for principles six and eight, which includes the human rights 
requirement and the duty of assistance22. The representatives in the original positions know 
that they represent liberal or decent peoples. Therefore they know that the human rights of 
their own members are catered for. Nothing inherent in or attributable to the use of an original 
position argument is suggesting then, that the representatives of liberal peoples would select 
the human rights principle or the duty of assistance (Costa 2005, 55). 
Even if the original position in itself does not lead to the human rights principle and 
the duty of assistance, we might plausibly assume that liberal (and decent) peoples are of such 
a nature that they would care about the rights of individuals in other societies and therefore 
endorse a human rights requirement. This assumption however, leaves the “(…) explanatory 
and justificatory power of the original position (…) trivial”(Costa, 2005, 55). Since the 
principles are not the result of the use of the original position, but rather the assumptions of 
the benevolence about the involved parties, the human rights requirement and the duty of 
assistance is given no added normative force by the fact that they are selected in an original 
position (Costa 2005, 54). 
To clarify what is meant by “added normative force”, I find it helpful to make a 
parallel to TJ. For instance, assume that I am sceptical of egalitarianism. If I accept the use of 
a Rawlsian social contract to decide the principles of justice, then reading TJ might convince 
me that my sceptical first intuition was wrong founded, as the second principle of justice 
plausibly follows from the use of the original position. Conversely, assume that I, a member 
of a liberal democratic people, do not believe that there exists any duties across societies, or 
that as long as another society is peaceful to its surroundings, its internal affairs are not of any 
concern for the people I myself belong to. Even if I endorse the use of the original position as 
it is used in LP, reading Rawls’s theory of international justice will provide me with no reason 
to reconsider my position. I will still reject the human rights requirement and the duty of 
assistance. 
At first this point may seem trivial, as arguably most people believe we should care 
about the rights of individuals in other states, and that we should help individuals in other 
states to achieve at least a minimum standard of living. However upon consideration, perhaps 
there is more depth to the point that warrants further consideration. Consider for instance the 
                                                
22 Several others make similar remarks. Alistair Macleod (2006, 142) for instance argues that a people-populated 
original position is not well suited to deriving a human rights principle. Pettit (2006, 54) notes that positive 
duties make up the weakness of Rawls’s international theory. Pogge (2006, 212) notes that Rawls does not 
explain why the representatives would choose the duty of assistance principle. 
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fact that hunger is by far the number one health risk worldwide and kills more people every 
year than AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis combined (World Food Programme 2012). 
Furthermore the fact that the cost of addressing this and similar problems related to very basic 
human rights would be relatively insignificant on advanced societies. That these problems 
persist and even deepen, suggests that providing arguments (as opposed to assumptions) in 
favour of a human rights principle and duties of assistance, should be an integral part of 
constructing a theory of international justice. 
If the original position provides the argument for the principles, then the selection of 
the human rights principle and the duty of assistance seems about as plausible as the 
assumption that Rawls’s first and second principle of justice from TJ would be chosen in a 
domestic original position where only representatives of the best-off group of society were 
represented. Obviously, there might be certain assumptions one can plausibly attribute to 
liberal peoples, which explains why the human rights principle would be chosen in the 
original position23. However my point has been that since Rawls depends on assumptions on 
the benevolent characteristics of the represented actors, his theory provides no added 
normative force to the human rights principle or the duty of assistance.24 
In the next chapter I begin my discussion of whether Rawls’s list of human rights can 
be plausibly defended. Here I consider a common liberal criticism of Rawls, namely that he 
relies on an argument from moral relativism, which says that a list of human rights must be 
acceptable to decent peoples that reject the liberal idea that all individuals should be treated as 
free and of equal moral worth. 
                                                
23 In chapter 6 I argue that it is plausible to assume that liberal peoples would endorse a human rights principle, 
because liberal peoples believe all domestic societies should respect human rights. In chapter 11 I argue that the 
duty of assistance is more problematic in this respect because it implies duties, while the human rights principle 
does not. 
24 The fact that Rawls’s original position argument for principles of international justice provides no added 
normative force for the duty of assistance is the main reason for why I attempt to sketch an alternative theory of 
international justice in chapter 11. 
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4 Rawlsian Human Rights and 
Rawlsian Tolerance 
Rawls (1999b, 68) writes that the list of human rights he describes in LP can be accounted for 
in two ways: 
 
One is to view them as belonging to a reasonably just liberal political conception of 
justice and as a proper subset of the rights and liberties secured to all free and equal 
citizens in a constitutional liberal democratic regime. The other is to view them as 
belonging to an associationist social form (as I have called it) which sees persons first 
as members of groups – associations, corporations, and estates. 
 
However, what is the significance of the fact (if it indeed is a fact) that his list of rights can be 
seen as belonging to an associationist social form? For example, does this fact provide the 
reason for why the list is only a limited subset of the rights and liberties of a liberal 
democratic regime when it is viewed as belonging to a reasonably just liberal political 
conception of justice? 
In this chapter I discuss the claim by Rawls that a list that is not acceptable to the 
associationist moral beliefs of decent peoples, would be illegitimate. Instead Rawls argues 
that liberal peoples should tolerate decent peoples, and presumably therefore only apply a 
narrow doctrine of human rights. One of Rawls’s arguments for why liberal peoples would 
choose to tolerate decent peoples is based on the idea of reasonable pluralism, which liberal 
peoples, according to Rawls, would apply wider in the international than the domestic setting.  
4.1 Tolerance for “Not Fully Unreasonable” 
Pluralism 
The justification of Rawls’s list of human rights I discuss in this chapter combines three 
elements of Rawls’s thinking to provide a defence for his narrow conception of human rights. 
These elements are the following: First, the fact of reasonable pluralism. Second, the criterion 
of reciprocity. Third, the stipulation by Rawls that decent peoples are not fully unreasonable. 
The idea of reasonable pluralism is central in PL. The Law of Peoples extends this 
idea to the international realm. Rawls’s view of reasonable pluralism entails the criterion of 
reciprocity. 
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The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as the most 
reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must think it at least 
reasonable for others to accept them (…). Citizens will of course differ as to which 
conceptions of political justice they think the most reasonable, but they will agree that 
all are reasonable, even if barely so (Rawls 1999b, 136-137). 
 
For the purposes of international theory, “citizens” in the above quote might presumably be 
substituted with “peoples”. To tolerate reasonable pluralism then is to act according to the 
criterion of reciprocity. This criterion (or norm) is, according to Rawls, a central feature of 
liberal thinking. Rawls (1999b, 74, 83) does however admit that decent peoples are not 
reasonable because they do not treat their members as free and equal. Therefore it seems that 
the conception of justice that underlines the political system in decent societies is not 
reasonable. Consequently, decent peoples’ reasons for rejecting human rights that ensures 
non-discrimination, equal participation and freedom of speech are not strictly speaking 
reasonable. However, Rawls (1999b, 74) finds space for his account of decent peoples “(…) 
between the fully unreasonable and the fully reasonable”. The stipulation by Rawls, that 
decent peoples are not fully unreasonable, leads Allen Buchanan (2006, 154) to dryly point 
out that in LP it is seemingly the fact of “(…) not unreasonable pluralism (…)” that 
underlines Rawls’s conception of human rights.25  
The difference in the implicit use of not unreasonable pluralism in LP and reasonable 
pluralism in PL signals an important lack of parity in the role of the term “reasonable 
pluralism” between the two theories. If Rawls’s domestic theory stipulated that political 
liberalism should tolerate pluralism that is not fully unreasonable, then presumably the 
democratic society this theory is meant for would not any longer be allowed to be democratic. 
This does not necessarily mean that Rawls falls prey to a theoretical inconsistency. There 
might be differences between international society and a domestic democratic society that 
warrants the lack of parity. Rawls suggests one when he writes that there is an even greater 
plurality of comprehensive doctrines in international society than within a constitutional 
democracy (Rawls 1999b, 40,18). 
 
If a reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is a basic feature of a 
constitutional democracy with its free institutions, we may assume that there is an 
                                                
25 Even Buchanan’s comment might be charitable on Rawls as there is a difference between “not unreasonable” 
and “not fully unreasonable”, the latter being seemingly more inclusive. I will use the latter, since it mirrors what 
Rawls writes. 
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even greater diversity in the comprehensive doctrines affirmed among the members of 
the Society of Peoples with all its many different cultures and traditions (Rawls, 
1999b, 40). 
 
This might be true, although I suspect some multicultural modern democracies have 
representatives for virtually any culture in the world within its borders. In any case, the fact 
that the international society is more pluralistic than a domestic one hardly justifies making 
concessions on principles of international justice. The fact (if it is a fact) that international 
society is more pluralistic than any domestic society merely highlights that some societies 
have intolerant and oppressive laws. 
Rawls (1999b, 68) holds that his list of human rights: “(…) do not depend on any 
particular comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical doctrine of human nature”. For 
example, the assumption that all human beings are of equal moral value would seemingly be 
to rely on such a doctrine. However, according to Rawls (1999b, 68) “[t]o argue this way 
would involve religious or philosophical doctrines that many decent hierarchical peoples 
might reject as liberal or democratic (…)”. Here Rawls is at least implying that relying on a 
philosophical doctrine that sees all humans as of equal moral value, when constructing a 
doctrine of human rights, is illegitimate because the denial of such beliefs by peoples who 
subscribe to an associationist conception of individual good is not unreasonable (Buchanan 
158).26 Rawls’s (1999b, 83-84) argument that decent hierarchical peoples that deny the view 
of individual good as held by liberalism, deserve to be treated equally to liberal peoples, and 
should be tolerated, seems to support Buchanan’s interpretation here. Thus, it seems what 
Rawls is stating is that some non-liberal societies, with an associationist view of individual 
good, deserve to be tolerated, and therefore liberal peoples can only endorse a list of human 
rights that decent non-liberal peoples can accept. 
This argument from Rawls is problematic. Buchanan (2006, 155-156) points out that it 
is hardly uncontroversial that the moral beliefs of decent peoples are not unreasonable. And 
even if they are not unreasonable, it is equally dubious that in order to be tolerant we should 
modify our list of human rights to accommodate such not unreasonable views.  
   
If the reason why someone can “not unreasonably” reject a human rights norm is that 
his conception of morality is seriously distorted by indefensible beliefs (of women for 
                                                
26 Such a view of the individual good does not take basis in the individual, the way liberalism does. Instead it 
works from an understanding that the basic interests of an individual cannot be specified without reference to the 
individual’s group-identity (Buchanan 2006, 157). 
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instance), then it may not be intolerant to impose that norm on him. (Buchanan 2006, 
156) 
 
Following a similar line of reasoning, Caney (2002, 102-104) argues that the various 
practices allowed in decent societies, such as discrimination, shows that decent societies are 
intolerant. From this he argues that Rawlsian tolerance for decent peoples, contrary to what 
Rawls claims, is in fact intolerant (2002, 104). 
The wielders of power in decent societies deny that persons should be treated as free 
and equal. It seems unacceptable that such beliefs about morality should constrain the list of 
human rights. Anyone who denies that this is unacceptable would have to explain why all 
persons should not be treated as free and equal. This is perhaps the central assumption of any 
form liberalism. It seems strange of course, that liberal peoples would choose principles of 
international justice that committed them to argue that persons in decent societies should not 
be treated as free and equal. 
4.2 Objectivity and Moral Relativism 
At the conclusion of LP Rawls (1999b, 121) poses the question of whether the idea to develop 
a Law of Peoples from the point of view of liberal societies is ethnocentric or merely western. 
According to Rawls, it does not need to be, as it largely depends on what the contents of such 
a law turns out to be. If it can satisfy the criterion of reciprocity and be part of the public 
reason of a society of liberal and decent peoples, then Rawls believes it could be objective (as 
opposed to ethnocentrically western). This claim of objectivity however has a rather obvious 
response. Namely that an even more objective Law of Peoples, without any human rights 
requirement, would be acceptable to even more societies. This more inclusive Law of Peoples 
would, of course, be compatible with great injustice and seem unacceptable. However if 
injustice is the parameter, it also seems to be unacceptable to reject freedom of speech and 
democratic participation and non-discrimination as human rights. When Rawls uses the word 
“objectivity”, what he seems to really mean is moral relativism. Furthermore, it is seemingly a 
type of moral relativism that goes quite deep because it upsets rights that any liberal would 
deem very important. To consider such rights “merely western”, and furthermore to call the 
rejection of such rights “objectivity” seems to obscure this fact. 
Rawls’s use of reasonable pluralism at the international level would appear to test our 
commitment to the liberal assumption that all persons should be seen as free and equal when 
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principles of justice that involve them are developed. What Rawls seems to be arguing with 
the use of international “not fully unreasonable” pluralism, is that since some peoples would 
reject this assumption, then for the purposes of international theory, we should reject it as 
well. It seems unlikely that liberal peoples would agree with Rawls because he asks them to 
betray their most basic set of beliefs. There might be reasons why it is unreasonable to apply a 
human rights list that includes liberal rights on non-liberal peoples. In this chapter however, I 
have argued that the fact that non-liberal peoples deny liberalism as “merely western” is not a 
reason that is acceptable, least of all to liberal peoples. In this respect Rawls’s extension of 
toleration for reasonable pluralism to international theory fails. 
Leif Wenar has argued that Rawls believes that although decent peoples are internally 
unjust, they are legitimately governed. This is possible because legitimacy, according to 
Wenar is a significantly more permissive standard than justice. This might provide a stronger 
argument for why the list of human rights should be acceptable to decent peoples. Because it 
seems a sensible claim to say that regimes that are morally justified in enforcing their laws27 
should be tolerated. In the next chapter I argue that Wenar is wrong on two dimensions. 
Firstly, his arguments are unpersuasive because legitimacy is more closely related to justice 
than he assumes (or argues that Rawls assumes). Secondly, in my opinion, Wenar 
misconstrues Rawls’s position. I believe this is partly because he misses an opportunity to 
make the important distinction between internal and recognitional legitimacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
27 I take internal political legitmacy to mean that the wielders of power in a society are morally justified in 
enforcing their laws. This, in my view plausible definition, is taken from Buchanan (2004, 233). 
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5 Leif Wenar’s Account of Rawlsian 
Legitimacy 
Leif Wenar (2004; 2006) develops a coherent and unifying interpretation of Rawls’s works in 
general. His understanding of Rawls’s stance on international justice and legitimacy is based 
on the assumption that the principles of the Law of Peoples must be acceptable to the moral 
views of decent persons, as members of decent peoples. As such it can be seen as a response 
to some of Rawls’s liberal critics. Central to Wenar’s interpretation is the issue of legitimacy, 
which he claims is a more permissive standard than justice. Wenar’s reconstruction of 
Rawls’s arguments seeks to understand all of Rawls’s theories in a unified way, dispelling 
critical claims of inconsistencies. Consequently, his interpretation appears clarifying. 
There is political legitimacy in decent societies, on Wenar’s understanding of Rawls, 
because it is appropriate to regard the members of a decent society as having decent views. If 
decent societies are legitimate, so the argument goes, then the Law of Peoples must be 
acceptable to decent peoples. However, or so I argue, Wenar’s account of Rawls seemingly 
relies on an understanding of legitimacy that is both contextually and conceptually 
implausible. 
5.1 Legitimacy: The Appropriateness of Regarding 
Persons as Decent 
Wenar (2006, 100) argues that Rawls’s later work (PL and LP) must be seen in relation to a 
theory of political legitimacy. This theory of political legitimacy finds its fullest expression in 
PL. Wenar (2006, 100) derives what he calls Rawls’s “fundamental norm of legitimacy” from 
the liberal principle of legitimacy in PL. Importantly it also involves a significant adjustment 
that is based on what is written by Rawls in LP. According to Wenar (2006, 100), this 
fundamental norm is the following: 
 
[T]he exercise of coercive political power over persons is legitimate only when this 
exercise of power is in accordance with a basic structure that those persons can accept, 
regarding those persons as either decent or reasonable, as appropriate.28 
                                                
28 It is important to note that these are Wenar’s words. Rawls (1993, 137) only formulates a liberal principle of 
legitimacy in PL. This principle is similar the one quoted here. Importantly it lacks the reference to decent 
persons. Therefore Wenar’s fundamental norm of legitimacy is an adjustment of Rawls’s principle of political 
legitimacy based on what Rawls writes about toleration for decent peoples in LP. 
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That the liberal principle of legitimacy is reduced in this way to cater for the views of 
“decent persons” seems problematic, because these views lead to seriously unjust policies. 
Wenar (2006, 100) writes that legitimacy is a more permissive standard than justice. However 
whilst this might be the case, nonetheless it is still closely related to justice. A plausible 
definition of internal political legitimacy is that it rests on whether the wielders of power are 
morally justified in enforcing their laws (Buchanan 2004, 233).29 This seems to be in line with 
Rawls’s understanding of the term (Rawls 1993, 136-137). Since moral justification and 
justice are related, the injustice of laws should always raise deep questions of their legitimacy. 
However the beliefs of the members of society may be a factor. This raises the question of 
how the beliefs of the dominant groups of a society relate to the issue of legitimacy. 
In a decent society, where there are no democratic institutions and a restriction on free 
speech, it is difficult to know if the members generally would endorse these laws if they were 
given the chance to change them. However, for the purposes of this discussion, let us assume 
that this is not a valid concern. Wenar’s fundamental norm of legitimacy alludes to the 
intuitive idea that the beliefs of the members of the society in question also are important to 
the idea of legitimacy. These beliefs might upset the close relationship between legitimacy 
and justice. However, they are only relevant to a certain extent. For the argument for 
legitimacy that Wenar attributes to Rawls to be plausible, it is seemingly dependent on all the 
persons in a decent society having decent views. There will presumably always be reasonable 
persons within decent societies. These persons might believe that the society should be a 
liberal democracy. Wenar’s norm of legitimacy begs the question of whether the isolated fact 
that some reasonable individuals live within the borders of decent societies is sufficient 
ground to think it “appropriate”, to use the decent perspective when assessing the legitimacy 
of exercising political power over such individuals? It seems implausible in my view that an 
affirmative answer to this question can be made. However, if we hold that the answer to this 
question in fact is yes, we are committed to saying that a reasonable person in a decent society 
that breaks an unreasonable law, for instance one restricting the freedom of speech, can, from 
a moral perspective, be legitimately sentenced to punishment. I do not think that the 
popularity of certain beliefs really changes the conclusions of the the last chapter. Laws that 
violate important liberal rights are not morally justified simply because a significant part of 
society endorses them. 
                                                
29 See footnote 27. 
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Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy, on the other hand seems a plausible account of 
legitimacy. This principle states that “(…) our exercise of political power is fully proper when 
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse (…)”. Some might say that a particular 
dominant reasonable belief within a society might make the laws in this society less just, but 
legitimate still. For instance, a social democrat might argue that the conservative political 
majority of the people to which she belongs leads to a lack of justice. However, regardless of 
whether her assessment is accurate, this does not mean that legitimacy is not present. I think 
this is a more plausible account of how legitimacy is a more permissive standard than justice 
than the one inherent in Wenar’s argument. 
5.2 Legitimate Viewpoints in the Global Political 
Culture 
When Rawls addresses international justice, he must according to Wenar (2006, 102), draw 
upon the global political culture to find ideas that are acceptable to all. However, the global 
political culture is mainly international, not interpersonal. This contributes to explaining the 
use of an original position of peoples instead of individuals. However, the problem is that if 
the views of decent persons affect the limits of legitimacy, this would presumably mean that 
the principles chosen in the first second-level original position would have to be acceptable to 
the moral viewpoints of decent peoples as well as those of liberal peoples. When Wenar 
writes that Rawls must draw upon the global political culture to find ideas that are acceptable 
to all, he means acceptable to all decent and liberal persons, and by extension all legitimate 
peoples. However, as I have argued, in societies where persons with decent viewpoints on 
morality dominate, political power is not legitimately wielded. If this is so, then there is no 
reason why Rawls must constrain the human rights principle so that it is acceptable to all 
decent persons the way Wenar argues. 
5.3 Internal and Recognitional Legitimacy: An 
Important Difference 
Legitimacy, according to Wenar (2006, 100), is a more permissive standard than justice. And 
yet: 
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(…) [T]he laws of a legitimate basic structure are sufficiently just that it is justifiable 
to enforce them. Moreover, the laws of a legitimate basic structure are sufficiently just 
that foreigners may not permissibly intervene to attempt to change these laws. 
Legitimacy is in this way a primitive concept of normative recognition both for those 
within and for those outside a basic structure. 
 
This definition of legitimacy equates internal political legitimacy and recognitional 
legitimacy. This is potentially problematic. 
For Rawls (1999b, 67) “[t]he decent common good idea of hierarchical peoples is a 
minimal idea [of justice]”. While it is an outline of only a minimal idea of justice, its presence 
in a domestic society is sufficient to warrant recognition as an equal participating member of 
the Society of Peoples (Rawls 1999b, 67-68). Decency then, is not an outline of internal 
legitimacy for non-liberal peoples. It is exclusively intended on specifying what it takes for a 
society to be afforded recognitional legitimacy. I believe there is merit to Wenar’s argument 
when he states that a theory of legitimacy is central to both PL and LP. However, he assumes 
too much when arguing that Rawls believes there is internal legitimacy in decent societies. 
Rawls only states that decent peoples deserve to be recognized as equal members of the 
Society of Peoples. Therefore, the correct assessment should be that while a theory of internal 
political legitimacy is central to PL, a theory of recognitional legitimacy is central to LP. 
Wenar’s interpretation of Rawls fails to provide a convincing defence for his short list 
of human rights. This is due to legitimacy being closely related to justice and also because it 
seems questionable to suggest that it is appropriate to view all the members of decent 
societies as having decent views just because they reside within the borders of such societies. 
However, since the Law of Peoples focuses exclusively on the issue of recognitional 
legitimacy, it is only the claim that decency is an appropriate standard for recognitional 
legitimacy that needs to be defended, not that decent peoples are internally legitimate, as 
Wenar’s interpretation assumes. On the surface there seems little grounds to suggest that the 
standards for recognitional legitimacy should not be the same as those for internal legitimacy. 
However, the distinction between the two types of legitimacy takes on greater relevance in 
later chapters. The reason why this distinction becomes important is that Rawls provides an 
argument that can be seen to upset the straightforward grounding of recognitional legitimacy 
in whether there can be said to be internal legitimacy30. 
                                                
30 I elaborate on this point in chapters 7 and 8. 
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It seems that Wenar’s fundamental norm of legitimacy does not change the fact that it 
seems implausible to say that liberal peoples would make concessions on the human rights 
principle to cater for the beliefs of decent peoples. Furthermore, they are in their rights not to, 
because the decent point of view on morality is at odds with aspects of justice that are 
fundamental to internal legitimacy. 
5.4 Two Alternative Routes for Other Justifications 
for Rawls’s List of Human Rights 
This chapter concludes my discussion of the argument that the human rights principle must be 
acceptable to the moral beliefs of peoples that deny that persons should be treated as free and 
equal. I have argued that this is not a compelling argument. Furthermore that invoking a term 
like legitimacy does not change this fact, even though the dominant groups of society might 
endorse the laws of the decent polity. 
It seems that a defence for Rawls’s list of human rights at this point must proceed 
along one of two alternative routes: It must either find an alternative reason (than the moral 
beliefs of decent peoples) that explains why it would be unreasonable of liberal peoples to 
impose on decent peoples the rules of a Law of Peoples with a human rights principle that 
include the human rights Rawls calls liberal aspirations. Or it must find a defence of Rawls’s 
list of human rights that is not grounded in the fact of reasonable pluralism or the criterion of 
reciprocity. I will discuss both routes and start with the latter. In the next chapter I therefore 
discuss Freeman’s (2006b) defence of Rawls’s list of human rights. 
Freeman, one of Rawls’s most dedicated defenders, has provided a justification for 
why the list of human rights is narrow, and does so without relying on the morally relativistic 
argument of tolerance for the moral beliefs of decent peoples. As the last two chapters have 
demonstrated, I am critical of this decency-limited moral relativism. Therefore Freeman’s 
alternative justification offers much promise. Regardless, I will go on to argue that Freeman’s 
defence of Rawlsian human rights fails at three important levels and should therefore be 
rejected. 
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6 Freeman: Self-Interested 
Representatives and the Security 
Argument 
It is possible that Rawls’s view is that his list of human rights is simply compatible with an 
associationist or decent view of the good and not that it is constrained by such a view. 
Furthermore, that Rawls believes this strengthens his theory, because those rejecting liberal 
principles cannot reject it as “merely western”. If this is the case then the question that needs 
answering is how the same list of rights can be chosen in an original position of liberal 
peoples, regardless of the views and beliefs of decent peoples. 
In this chapter, I discuss Freeman’s (2006b) justification for why representatives of 
liberal peoples in the original position would restrict their conception of human rights to the 
basic list provided by Rawls. This justification is not grounded in any form of moral 
relativism. Furthermore, this justification is compatible with the universal nature of liberal 
rights. I will argue that the argument this justification rests on fails at three important levels, 
and therefore should be rejected. 
6.1 Freemans Defence of Rawls’s List of Human 
Rights 
Tan (2005, 696-7) observes that a quite common cosmopolitan critique of LP is that even 
following the logic of Rawls’s account, using an original position of peoples instead of 
individuals, liberal peoples would select a more inclusive list of human rights. However, what 
principles are selected and how they are interpreted depends on how the representatives of 
liberal peoples are modelled. Part of the purpose of the use of an original position with a veil 
of ignorance is that the principles arrived at only reflect the self-interest of the representatives, 
as it is manifested and constrained by the use of a veil of ignorance. 
The second-level original position is designed to decide the principles that should 
guide the foreign policy of liberal peoples and the rules that should govern the Society of 
Peoples. Rawls starts by populating this original position with liberal peoples. These 
representatives know that the internal justice of their own societies is at a standard that 
satisfies their own conception of justice, because they are aware of their representation of 
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liberal peoples. Freeman (2006b, 47) bases a defence of Rawls’s list of human rights on this 
observation by writing: 
  
Importantly, (…) the representatives of liberal peoples are concerned solely with 
promoting the “fundamental interests” of the individual society that each one 
represents. (…) their main aim is to obtain terms of cooperation among peoples that 
best guarantee liberal justice within their own society and among their own people. 
(…) they are not moved by benevolence toward other peoples or even by a concern 
that liberal justice be done for its own sake. They are mutually indifferent in this 
regard. 
 
 The modelling of the representatives in this way reflects the way the original position 
is used in Rawls’s domestic theories. One of the obvious strengths of this modelling is that by 
letting the representatives only care about their own interests, the normative force of the 
subsequently chosen principles of justice will potentially be strong. Rawls can say that they 
are chosen purely on the self-interest of the actors involved, as this self-interest manifests 
itself when choices are made under a veil of ignorance that hides information that is arbitrary 
from a moral perspective. As long as one agrees with Rawls that certain information is 
arbitrary from a moral perspective, it is easy to be persuaded by his argument for the selected 
principles. 
To transfer this logic to the second-level original position of liberal peoples seems to 
answer the liberal criticism of LP I presented at the beginning of this section. This is the 
argument that representatives for liberal peoples would select a list of rights that included 
rights that liberal peoples believe all individuals should enjoy (Freeman 2006b, 48).31 If we 
assume, as Freeman does, that the representatives only care about the interests of their own 
society, and are not moved by benevolence or that liberal justice be done for its own sake, 
then it is true that they have no reason select a list of human rights that include liberal rights. 
Before one gets too carried away with this defence of Rawls however, it should be noted that 
it seems to come at a great cost. If the representatives of liberal peoples are modelled as 
exclusively self-interested, then why do they choose any human rights at all? Is seems more 
natural for the representatives to dismiss both the human rights principle and the duty of 
assistance, and let the remaining principle guide their foreign policies. 
                                                
31 Freeman presents his understanding of Rawls as part of an exchange of arguments with Tan. Tan (2005, 698) 
responds to Freeman by arguing that ”(…) [I]t is representatives of individuals who ought to be present at a 
global original position. A liberal construction of justice could not proceed in any other way given liberalism’s 
fundamental commitment to individual well-being,” My thesis however, assumes that a cosmopolitan original 
position is not an option. For my purposes then, Tan’s argument for a global original position is blocked.  
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 Freeman (2006b, 49) answers this objection by noting that concerns for their own 
security can form the rationale for choosing Rawls’s list of human rights. According to 
Freeman (2006b, 49), liberal peoples have much reason to fear states that do not honour 
Rawlsian human rights. Especially if one assumes that they have such a society as a 
neighbouring country. Behind the veil of ignorance, the representatives presumably have no 
information about the level of internal justice in neighbouring states, or the relative strength 
of such societies. The people they represent might be situated besides a state much stronger 
than their own that readily violates the human rights of their own members. Therefore they 
would endorse a constrained list of human rights in order to guard their own security and the 
rights of their own citizens. Freemans argument is contingent on an understanding that states 
that do not honour Rawlsian human rights always, or nearly always, constitute security risks 
for liberal peoples or risks to the rights of their citizens, at least if these liberal peoples are the 
neighbouring countries of such outlaw states. 
 It is important to note that Freeman does not deny that liberal peoples are concerned or 
even fundamentally invested in their liberal aspirations for the rest of the world. His argument 
is only that such concerns are not supposed to be present in the original position, where self-
interested representatives select the principles of justice. 
6.2 The problems of the security argument 
One important aspect of this defence of Rawls is that it wields a very internally consistent 
conclusion. Freeman’s defence seems to explain why the list of human rights is constrained to 
the basic. Moreover, since purely self-interested representatives of liberal peoples select the 
human rights principle, the argument seemingly adds normative force to the idea of universal 
human rights. Finally it contributes to align Rawls’s domestic and international theories, as 
the first-level and second-level original position are used in the same way. The problems, in 
my opinion, are correspondingly threefold: First, it is questionable that the honouring of 
Rawlsian human rights is a necessary condition for non-aggression against liberal peoples, 
and the preserving of the liberal and urgent human rights of their citizens. Second, such a 
rationale for a list of human rights is, despite the claims of Freeman, instrumental and rhymes 
very badly with the ideas human rights are founded on. Third, Freeman’s view of the proper 
representative of a liberal people defies plausible intuitions of what the interests of such an 
actor should be. Correspondingly, Freeman relies on an interpretation of Rawls that, at 
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important conjunctions, seems to contradict what Rawls is actually saying. In the following 
subsections, I will discuss these problems more extensively and draw upon the conclusion that 
Freeman’s arguments are seriously flawed. 
6.2.1 Security Risks 
While Freemans argument that security concerns would drive representatives of decent 
peoples to endorse Rawls’s list of human rights is somewhat intuitively plausible, it could be 
criticized as being both too optimistic and too pessimistic on behalf of the virtues of 
individual rights. 
It might seem plausible that there would generally be a significant gap in the security 
risks between states that honour Rawlsian human rights and those that do not. Therefore 
liberal peoples would want to insure that no states violated Rawlsian human rights. However, 
this gap of insecurity might be significantly bigger, and reflect more accurately a stable 
solution, if it is set between states that do not honour Rawlsian human rights and states that 
are democratic. Rawls himself writes quite extensively on the idea of a “democratic peace”. 
 
Though liberal democratic societies have often engaged in war against nondemocratic 
states, since 1800 firmly established liberal societies have not fought one another. 
(Rawls 1999b, 51) 
 
If Rawls is right here then the security of liberal might be more stable if all societies 
were required to be liberal democracies. Therefore one could argue that the representatives 
would not choose Rawls’s list of human rights, but a list that included liberal rights as well. 
However, not only the possibility of the aggressive foreign policies of certain states 
that regularly violate human rights is a concern here. The populations of outlaw states might 
be driven to inflict violence, aggression or other criminal activities such as terrorism on 
foreign soil or piracy in surrounding or international waters. Freeman might argue that states 
that violate Rawlsian human right are always dangerous at least to their neighbouring states 
either through their deprived populations or through their foreign policy (Freeman 2006b, 49). 
Nondemocratic states on the other hand are only dangerous under certain conditions. 
However, is it true that states that violate Rawls’s list of human rights are always dangerous 
to their surroundings? According to Charles Beitz (2000, 685) “(…) it is not hard to think of 
regimes which are oppressive domestically but whose international conduct is not “aggressive 
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and dangerous””. Freeman (2006b, 49) fends off this objection by arguing that the foreign 
policy of a state that does not honour human rights is not the only issue:  
 
One only has to look at the dislocation of individuals and the disruption and war 
among neighboring nations that is caused by violations of human rights in Africa 
today. 
 
I do not believe that this is a satisfactory reply because it is possible to imagine 
societies were the violation of the basic human rights of the members has no consequence for 
their neighboring countries. The violating might for instance be geared towards a small 
minority. Or it could be perpetrated by a state with a strong and absolutistic institutional 
foothold on society. This is often not the case in the African example Freeman is referring to. 
One might, like Rawls does with decent hierarchical peoples, argue that it is possible for such 
societies to exist. However, more concrete examples could possibly be made. For example, it 
is likely that South Africa under Apartheid did not honour Rawlsian human rights. Moreover, 
it is not clear that any representative of liberal peoples, out of pure self-interests generally and 
security concerns specifically, would object to the lack of honouring of such rights in a state 
like Apartheid South Africa. Whether or not this is a valid example however, is not that 
important. The important thing is that it is far from impossible for a society that Freeman’s 
representatives would accept and which violates Rawls list of human rights to exist. 
Concluding on this discussion, it is difficult to be convinced by the argument that 
security concerns would lead liberal representatives to endorse Rawls’s specific list of human 
rights. They could possibly choose a higher level of human rights, but they could also 
disregard the human rights principle altogether and let the other principles guide non-ideal 
theory on a case-by-case basis. Societies that are security concerns for whatever reason would 
then be dealt with in whichever way best suited to accomplish compliance with the abridged 
version of the Law of peoples. Sometimes improvements on internal justice (for instance the 
urgent human rights situation) might be warranted, whilst not being the case in others. Under 
such a framework, a society mirroring that of South Africa under apartheid would presumably 
remain untouched by sanctions. The same would be the case for a variety of strongly 
organized states that subject its members to the cruellest forms of oppression. 
Obviously, if Freeman is correct in suggesting that the representatives of peoples in 
the original position should be modelled in the way he argues, and at the same time he is 
wrong to assume that this would lead to a human rights principle in the Law of Peoples, then 
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Rawls’s position is seriously compromised. A Law of Peoples without a human rights 
principle and a duty of assistance seems a grim representation of international justice. 
6.2.2 Instrumental Human Rights 
Assume that we accept the logic in Freemans argument that self-interested representatives for 
liberal peoples, under a veil of ignorance, would choose the same list of human rights as that 
presented by Rawls due to security concerns. However, is such an instrumental defense of 
human rights desirable? One could perhaps argue that if a list of universal human rights is 
chosen by representatives of liberal peoples because of their own security concerns, and not at 
all because of an understanding of the importance of the moral value of all individuals, then 
the justification is not viable because it is not arrived at for the right reasons. It seems 
unappealing that such an important idea as human rights should be bundled into a theory of 
justice because of concerns that have nothing to do with the concepts and ideas attached to 
human rights. 
 Freeman’s justification for the choice of the human rights principles seems to seriously 
contradict any intuition one could have about the nature and role of human rights. Freeman 
(2006b, 50) deals with this challenge specifically and argues that to see Rawls’s justification 
for human rights as purely instrumental, fails to acknowledge that “(…) the parties in the 
original position are only part of a larger argument.” By this he means the following: 
 
Just because, from the point of view of the parties to the original position, respect for 
human rights by other peoples is important for instrumental reasons, does not mean 
that the Law of Peoples regards human rights purely instrumentally or from a self-
interested perspective (Freeman 2006b, 50). 
 
 Although Freeman does not address Beitz or other liberal critics specifically here, it is 
natural to see the above citation in relation to comments Beitz (2000, 685) makes: 
  
(…) [T]he reason why people have human rights not to be tortured does not seem to be 
that regimes that torture are dangerous to other regimes: although the latter fact (if it is 
a fact) might justify intervention, it does not say anything about the moral situation of 
the tortured. 
 
Freeman’s point seems to be restricted to saying that the human rights principle in 
itself, and the rights it entails, are not seen by liberal (and decent) peoples, or the Law of 
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Peoples itself as instrumental. The justification for its inclusion among the principles of the 
Law of Peoples however, remains purely instrumental. Therefore his response against those 
that might criticize him for providing an unappealing justification for human rights seems to 
only address half of the issue (at least if one holds that it is relevant why a principle is 
selected). A human rights principle whose selection is justified without the slightest reference 
or acknowledgement of the well being of the persons involved is unappealing. How much of a 
problem this would be for Freeman’s argument is perhaps a point of contention. However, 
there is at least one further problem. 
Freeman seems to want to have it both ways. He does not deny that liberal peoples are 
fundamentally concerned with a broad understanding of human rights, and that they likely 
regard liberal rights as universally applicable. In fact part of his argument seemingly depend 
on it because he wants to argue that liberal peoples do not see the human rights principle as 
instrumental even though it is selected for instrumental reasons. However when liberal 
peoples deliberate on the human rights principle outside of the original position and endorse it 
for reasons that are not instrumental, they will also discover that they endorse a much more 
extensive list of human rights for the same non-instrumental reasons. There is an unsettling 
dissonance then, between the views of liberal peoples and their representatives in the original 
position. 
 Some of the point of modelling individuals as only self-interested in domestic theory, 
on my interpretation, is to show that personal beliefs or preconceived notions about justice are 
not necessary for the representatives of individuals to unanimously agree to the principles of 
justice Rawls is proposing. This gives Rawls’s vision great normative force. However, if one 
assumes that the fundamental interests of liberal peoples are not a matter of great contention, 
then there is a reduced need to model representatives for peoples the same way as individuals 
are modelled in domestic theory. It is self-evident that liberal peoples believe that all 
individuals should have rights like democratic participation and freedom of speech honoured 
by the state they live in. To not let their representatives in the original position take this into 
consideration when selecting principles of international justice seems strange. It might be 
argued that Freeman becomes so concerned with what he perceives to be the technical rules of 
an original position argument, that he fails to acknowledge the obvious and commonsensical 
solution of just modelling representatives of liberal peoples on some basic, uncontroversial 
assumptions of the interests of liberal peoples. After all, the representatives know that they 
represent liberal peoples. 
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It seems damaging to the appeal of the argument that the human rights principle would 
be selected among the principles of the Law of Peoples, that the only justification 
representatives for liberal peoples can find for endorsing such a principle, is that societies that 
do not respect such rights are threats to the security self-interests of liberal peoples. This 
justification is instrumental. Furthermore, the justification to not include liberal rights is also 
instrumental. This remains true whether or not liberal peoples themselves endorse human 
rights for more proper reasons. Furthermore, the assumptions about liberal peoples that 
Freeman uses to show that the Law of Peoples does not regard its human rights principle as an 
instrumental principle, reveals a dissonance between the Law of Peoples and liberal peoples. 
Freeman draws upon the moral nature of liberal peoples to argue that the human rights 
principle does not have an instrumental function in the Law of Peoples. However, this moral 
nature leads to a more inclusive list of human rights. 
6.2.3 Plausibility and Interpretation 
If the representatives know they represent liberal peoples, they should also know that liberal 
peoples are invested in the idea of human rights. Consequently this knowledge should 
influence the agreement reached by these representatives. If all liberal peoples agree that 
human rights, including liberal rights, are important in themselves, it seems likely that they 
would object to their representatives in the original position being modelled the way Freeman 
argues. Presumably a similar justification can be given for the modelling of individuals as 
self-interested in domestic theory. Many individuals care more or less exclusively about their 
own good. Because of this, it would be unfair of Rawls to model their representatives as being 
benevolent (however, it is not unfair to apply the veil of ignorance as it only hides 
information that is arbitrary from a moral point of view). This suggests that representatives of 
liberal peoples should be modelled to reflect some of the basic views of liberal peoples, 
including a strong concern for human rights broadly conceived because they would 
unanimously hold these interests. If they are not modelled this way, as Freeman suggests, they 
could (or one could claim that they would) reasonably dismiss the Law of Peoples as failing 
to reflect their interests by modelling their representatives unfairly. Importantly, this holds 
true whether or not Freeman’s interpretation of Rawls is plausible. I will now argue that his 
interpretation of Rawls seemingly contradicts Rawls’s own view. 
Rawls’s arguments in LP are sometimes difficult to coherently reconstruct, which 
leaves the door open to many different interpretations on the justification of his statements. 
48 
 
The arguments Freeman assigns to him concerning the modelling of representatives of liberal 
peoples however, seems more or less straightforwardly to contradict what he is saying. The 
somewhat limited cause there is for Freeman’s interpretation is overshadowed by the fact that 
Rawls never explicitly states what Freeman suggests. Being an assumption of such 
fundamental importance, this is surprising if Freeman’s interpretation is correct. However, the 
main point is that unless Rawls deliberately clouds the issue here, then what he writes 
contradicts Freemans interpretation. 
In order to refute Freeman’s interpretation of Rawls, one needs to look closer at his 
justification: 
 
Earlier in section 2.3 of The Law of Peoples, Rawls sets forth four fundamental 
interests of liberal peoples: “They seek [1] to protect their territory, [2] to ensure the 
security and safety of their citizens, and [3] to preserve their free political institutions 
and the liberties and free culture of their civil society. Beyond those interests, a liberal 
people [4] tries to assure reasonable justice for all its citizens and for all people” ( LP, 
29). In section 3.3 Rawls adds a further interest, [5] “a people’s proper self-respect of 
themselves as a people” ( LP, 34). It is important to my argument above and, I believe, 
to Rawls’s argument as well) that a distinction be drawn between the fundamental 
interests of liberal peoples, and the motivations of their representatives in the original 
position. It is a fundamental interest of liberal peoples “to assure reasonable justice . . . 
for all people”; this is what it means for a people to “have a moral nature.” But as for 
the representatives of peoples in the original position, they are not moved by this 
moral motive. Like the parties to the domestic original position, they are “modeled as 
rational” in Rawls’s sense ( LP, 32, 33), which means they are not morally motivated 
and are indifferent toward the interests of other parties and peoples they do not 
represent (except insofar as it promotes the fundamental interests of their own people). 
This motivational assumption of mutual indifference of the parties is necessary for the 
structure of the original position, in order for it to do the work Rawls assigns to it: 
namely, to regulate rational judgements (regarding the interests of those one 
represents) by reasonable constraints (the veil of ignorance and other constraints of 
right). Nevertheless, the fact that the parties’ representatives are modeled as purely 
rational and indifferent to one another and other peoples does not by any means imply 
that liberal peoples themselves are purely rational and indifferent. (Freeman 2006b, 
47n). 
 
The distinction Freeman wants to draw between the fundamental interests of liberal peoples 
and the motivations of their representatives in the original position is unaccounted for by 
Rawls himself. Furthermore, what Rawls (1999b, 33) writes seemingly contradicts it: 
 
(…) [T]he use of the original position at the second level [is] a model of representation 
in exactly the same way it is at the first. Any differences are not in how the model of 
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representation is used but in how it needs to be tailored given the agents modeled and 
the subject at hand. (…) 
  
This suggests that Rawls thinks the representatives can be modeled differently in international 
theory than domestic theory, because there are fundamental differences between the two sets 
of agents. Rawls (1999b, 33) then goes on to list the features of the international original 
position. For my purposes, the last and fifth stands out: 
 
[T]he selection of principles for the Law of Peoples is based (5) on a people’s 
fundamental interests, given in this case by a liberal conception of justice (already 
selected in the first original position). 
 
It should be apparent then, that Rawls is quite explicit that it is in fact the fundamental 
interests of a people, given by their conception of justice, that is the basis for the selection of 
principles for The Law of Peoples. If Rawls nevertheless intends what Freeman suggests 
however, then what he actually writes is not simply ambiguous. It is downright misleading. 
 It seems reasonably clear that Freeman’s interpretation conflicts with Rawls’s account. 
Some confusion might nevertheless arise because, seemingly oblivious to Freeman, the 
interests liberal peoples have to try to “(…) assure reasonable justice for all its citizens and for 
all peoples (…)” (1999b, 29), is not clearly held by Rawls to be a fundamental interest. 
However, it seems implausible that the conception of justice of liberal peoples, which makes 
up their fundamental interests, would not include the idea that all individuals have rights to 
democracy, freedom of speech and non-discrimination. 
 Freeman could perhaps argue that his defense of Rawls is not as much a plausible 
interpretation of LP as it is a necessary adjustment. Indeed he could be understood to imply as 
much (Freeman 2006b, 47n). My main point however, is not primarily that his interpretation 
differs too much from what Rawls actually writes (although this is significant). My argument 
has been, on the one hand, that it is implausible to model representatives of liberal peoples to 
be unconcerned about human rights (including liberal rights) violations in other societies. On 
the other, assuming that we nevertheless do model their representatives in the original 
position as exclusively self-interested, it is unclear that such representatives would in fact 
endorse the human rights principle in the way that Freeman suggests. Furthermore, even if we 
assume that they would, we are left with an unappealingly instrumental justification for 
Rawls’s doctrine of human rights. The fact that Rawls contradicts Freeman’s interpretation, 
simply adds to these more pressing concerns. On the back of all of these concerns I conclude 
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this discussion by noting that Freeman’s proposed justification for Rawls’s narrow conception 
of human rights is based on seriously flawed arguments and assumptions and should therefore 
be rejected. 
Thus far I have rejected the argument that a list of human rights must be acceptable to 
the non-liberal moral beliefs of decent peoples, even on the understanding that the question at 
hand is not directly the justice of a polity but whether it can be shown as legitimate. I have 
argued that the supposed fact that persons with decent beliefs dominate decent societies does 
not make the enforcement of fundamentally unjust laws morally justified. In the present 
chapter I have rejected Freeman’s defence of Rawls’s list of human rights, even though it did 
not depend on a morally relativistic justification. At this point it might seem as if the answer 
to the first question this thesis presents is that Rawls’s narrow doctrine of human rights cannot 
be plausibly defended. However, I will go on to argue that it can be. In the next chapter I 
return to the issue of concessions to the moral beliefs of decent peoples. However, the 
purpose of this chapter is to trace Rawls’s arguments and show that, although a common 
interpretation of Rawls is that his list of human rights is constrained out of tolerance for the 
moral beliefs of decent peoples, it is uncertain whether this is Rawls’s actual position. At best 
it leaves out one important aspect of his argument from the equation. This aspect, namely the 
value of self-determination for a people, opens up for to a more plausible understanding of 
Rawlsian human rights. 
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7 The Ambiguous Nature of Rawls’s 
Toleration Argument 
Does Rawls opt for a narrow doctrine of human rights because he believes a more extensive 
list of rights to be intolerant of what most liberals would argue to be unacceptable beliefs 
about morality? In my opinion, the arguments in LP remain ambiguous enough to coherently 
argue that he does not. In this chapter I elaborate on this opinion and adress three aspects of 
Rawls’s text to support this view. First, Rawls avoids making the point at junctures where it 
seems natural to do so. In fact he seemingly avoids making any explicit commitment to an 
argument that explains why human rights do not include liberal rights. Second, the times he 
seemingly addresses the argument of tolerance for the moral point of view of decent peoples 
as constitutive to the list of human rights, the argument can only be identified by implication. 
Third, when writing about toleration for decent peoples, Rawls implies a different argument 
for the narrow nature of his list of human rights than concessions to the moral beliefs of 
decent peoples, namely the value of self-determination for a people. 
7.1 The Difficulties in Identifying Rawls’s Argument 
The first problem with identifying Rawls’s view on human rights is that he seems to avoid 
making his point. Consider the following set of passages taken from pages 78-79 in LP. 
Rawls (1999b, 79) starts by stating: “It may be objected that the Law of Peoples is not 
sufficiently liberal”. At this point the reader is offered some hope of clarification. It would 
seem natural for Rawls to follow this statement with arguments explaining why the human 
rights doctrine should not be liberal, or conversely, why it indeed is sufficiently liberal. 
Instead, there are no arguments following the statement, only new statements that could only 
be generously described as hinting at an argument: 
  
[S]ome think of human rights as roughly the same rights that citizens have in a 
reasonable constitutional democratic regime; this view simply expands the class of 
human rights to include all the rights that liberal governments guarantee (Rawls 
1999b, 78). 
 
Rawls does not explain here why it would be wrong to hold the view he describes. Perhaps he 
feels that his response shows why it is absurd. However, to argue that it does would be to give 
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his response too much credit. A conception of human rights that include important liberal 
rights seems sensible. That liberal governments guarantee these same rights does not show 
why they should not be considered human rights. 
 Be that as it may, the type of argument that Rawls seems to allude to in this passage, 
is one that explains why liberal peoples would not choose roughly liberal human rights in the 
first second-level original position. It is perhaps not obvious that the knowledge, on the part 
of the representatives, that they are representing liberal peoples, would lead them to select a 
list of human rights that include the liberal rights they know all varieties of liberal peoples 
would honour and protect internally. However, when reflecting on the kind of human rights 
endorsed in the UDHR and the moral convictions of liberal peoples, it does seem likely that 
they would do so. Unfortunately Rawls provides no real and unambiguous explanation for 
why liberal peoples would not choose roughly liberal rights as human rights. The next 
passage offers little help, but could be said to hint at an explanation that should be familiar by 
now: 
 
Human rights in the Law of Peoples, by contrast, express a special class of urgent 
rights (…). The violation of this class of rights is equally condemned by both 
reasonable liberal peoples and decent hierarchical peoples (Rawls 1999b, 78-79) 
 
The last sentence here could be said to suggest that rights whose violation could not be 
condemned by both liberal peoples and decent hierarchical peoples alike, should not be seen 
as human rights. However, this is not what the sentence actually conveys. It simply makes the 
observation of the dual condemnation. It is a matter of interpretation to assume that singular 
condemnation would be the result of an unacceptable list of human rights. The elusive 
character of Rawls’s arguments is striking.  
The set of passages observed at here commenced by seemingly promising answers, yet 
no argument could be distinguished. Furthermore, a justification was only hinted at in a 
vague, inadequate manner. This non-committal treatment of the discussion on human rights 
seems to be a common theme throughout Rawls’s text. When Rawls (1999b, 80n) writes 
about the difference between proper human rights and liberal aspirations for instance, he 
provides no real justification for why liberal rights are seen as aspirations instead of as proper 
human rights. Rather, he seems to assume that this is common knowledge. 
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7.2 Implications over Explications 
Let’s return to the passage that leads Buchanan, among others, to interpret Rawls as 
suggesting that it would be wrong for liberal peoples to endorse a human rights doctrine that 
could not be accepted by an associationist view of the good, because this view is “not fully 
unreasonable”. The passage reads the following: 
  
These rights do not depend on any particular comprehensive religious doctrine or 
philosophical doctrine of human nature. The Law of Peoples does not say, for 
example, that human beings are moral persons and have equal worth in the eyes of 
God; or that they have certain moral and intellectual powers that entitle them to these 
rights. To argue in these ways would involve religious or philosophical doctrines that 
many decent hierarchical peoples might reject as liberal or democratic, or in some way 
distinctive of Western political tradition and prejudicial to other cultures. Still, the 
Law of Peoples does not deny these doctrines (Rawls 1999b, 68). 
 
Whatever Rawls might be implying, nowhere in this passage does he deviate from the 
ambiguous reasoning found in the passages discussed above. He does not explicitly state that 
a rejection from decent peoples is the reason why certain rights are not chosen by liberal 
peoples in the first original position. The only thing he explicitly states is that the rights 
chosen are compatible with the views of decent peoples. If he is not stating it explicitly 
however, we could argue, as Buchanan does, that he is strongly implying it and that it 
therefore is what he really means. The best we seem to get from Rawls is suggestive 
justifications. On this background, the idea of concessions to the beliefs of decent peoples is a 
plausible interpretation, even if Rawls fails to explicitly state that this is the reasoning behind 
the short list of human rights. This interpretation seems to be backed up by the fact that Rawls 
argues quite extensively that liberal peoples should tolerate decent peoples by both accepting 
them as equal participating members of the Society of Peoples and by not applying coercive 
sanctions on them. However, when Rawls writes about toleration for decent peoples he 
suggests a qualitatively different justification. 
7.3 Rawlsian Tolerance and the Value of Self-
Determination 
Toleration of decent peoples entails more than just exempting it from sanctions, which is the 
result of honouring human rights. To the extent that toleration means that a regime is exempt 
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from sanction, then also benevolent absolutisms are also tolerated. “To tolerate also means to 
recognize these non-liberal societies as equal participating members in good standing of the 
Society of Peoples (…)” (Rawls 1999b, 59). Furthermore, Rawls (1999b, 63) writes: 
 
The second step of ideal theory (…) challenges us to specify a second kind of society 
– a decent, though not a liberal society – to be recognized as a bona fide member of a 
politically reasonable Society of Peoples and in this sense “tolerated.” 
 
Thus it is important to note that Rawls’s arguments for “toleration” of decent peoples are not 
the same as his arguments for (or assumption of) his narrow doctrine of human rights. 
Rawlsian toleration then, seems to relate to the question of equal treatment and acceptance, as 
well as the selection of human rights. 
Even if toleration in some respects is a different issue from human rights, Rawls 
focuses his arguments in favour of toleration of decent peoples on the contention that decent 
peoples should not be coercively liberalized. 
 
(…) [I]f liberal peoples require that all societies be liberal and subject those that are 
not to politically enforced sanctions, then decent nonliberal peoples – if there are such 
– will be denied a due measure of respect by liberal peoples. (…) Denying respect to 
other peoples and their members requires strong reasons to be justified. Liberal 
peoples cannot say that decent peoples deny human rights, since (…) such peoples 
recognize and protect these rights (…) (Rawls 1999b, 61). 
 
It should be noted that Rawls seems to suggest here that the list of human right precedes the 
notion of toleration of decent peoples, and not the other way around. This is evident by the 
use of the fact that decent peoples respect human rights as an argument for why they should 
be tolerated. However, as is apparent from the wording, at this point Rawls is in fact tackling 
the question of whether decent peoples should be proper subjects of sanction. Since the list of 
human rights defines when sanctions in principle are justified, then presumably his arguments 
should be seen as part of a defence for his list of human rights. If this is the case, then Rawls 
must do better than to argue that decent peoples should not be sanctioned because they honour 
human rights. To say that toleration of decent peoples means that the human rights list must 
not include liberal rights, and at the same time say that we tolerate decent peoples because 
they respect the list of human rights is to make a circular argument. If Rawls did not say 
anything more than this, he would have provided no argument for why the list of human 
rights should not include liberal rights. However, he further addresses this issue by stating: 
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Leaving aside the deep question of whether some forms of culture and ways of life are 
good in themselves (as I believe they are), it is surely, ceteris paribus, a good for 
individuals and associations to be attached to their particular culture and to take part in 
its common public and civic life. In this way political society is expressed and fulfilled. 
This is no small thing. It argues for preserving significant room for the idea of a 
people’s self-determination (…) (Rawls 1999b, 61). 
 
A people’s self-determination then, is an important good according to Rawls. Since Rawls 
refers to this good when arguing that decent peoples should not be the subjects of coercive 
sanctions, it seems that the value Rawls puts on self-determination, is at least part of his 
argument for a short list of human rights. 
Some might think that narrowing a list of human rights because of the value of self-
determination is the same thing as narrowing it in deference to certain intolerant moral 
beliefs. However, the two arguments are clearly distinct and rest on quite different normative 
judgements. We might for instance say that it is irrelevant that someone who denies that 
human beings should be treated as free and equal rejects our conception of justice. At the 
same time we might accept that the value of self-determination can override some of our 
concerns for justice in other societies. 
At the start of this chapter I asked whether it is clear that Rawls chooses a narrow 
doctrine of human rights because he believes a more extensive list of rights to be intolerant of 
what most liberals would argue to be unacceptable beliefs about morality. I have shown that 
Rawls’s arguments that support this justification are ambiguous. Furthermore, I have shown 
that Rawls at least implies a different justification, namely the value of self-determination32. 
Furthermore, while the value of self-determination for a people does not have strong 
implications for internal legitimacy, it seems relevant for questions of recognitional 
legitimacy33. Liberals might for instance say the wielders of power in decent regimes are not 
morally justified in enforcing their laws because of the lack of liberal justice in such societies. 
At the same time they might argue that the level of internal justice in decent societies is at a 
sufficiently high level where further reform should not be applied in a way that violate self-
determination. Therefore they might extend such societies recognitional legitimacy. 
                                                
32 Note that for the value of self-determination to be a relevant justification for narrowing the list of human 
rights, Rawls must argue that his human rights list should only include those rights that, at least in principle, 
justify coercive sanctions. This, of course, is what Rawls argues. However, many will question whether this is a 
plausible way to conceive of human rights. The close connection between coercive sanctions and Rawls’s list of 
human rights is the subject of chapter 9. 
33 See chapter 5 where I discuss the role of legitimacy and argue that the Law of Peoples is exclusively 
concerned with the issue of recognitional legitimacy. 
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In the next chapter I discuss David Reidy’s defence of Rawls’s list of human rights. 
Reidy (2006) elaborates on what Rawls writes about the value of self-determination and 
develops a plausible defence for Rawls’s short list of human rights. 
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8 Intervention, Reciprocity and Self-
Determination 
Freeman (2006b, 47n) argues that his interpretation of LP34 is important to Rawls’s own 
argument for toleration because if the parties in the original position were assumed to be 
concerned that all individuals should enjoy liberal rights, then they would be concerned about 
the lack of liberal justice in all non-liberal decent peoples. Consequently they would select a 
more inclusive list of human rights, and subsequently not tolerate decent peoples. However, 
there is no question that liberal peoples believe that all individuals should enjoy liberal rights. 
If the reason why liberal peoples tolerate decent peoples is that their representatives failed to 
take this into account then Freeman’s interpretation explains how Rawlsian tolerance can 
result from an original position of liberal peoples and at the same time seemingly contradict 
liberal ideas. However, it is a very unappealing explanation because it relies on tricking 
liberal peoples to endorse a conclusion they seemingly otherwise would not make by 
modelling their representatives unfairly. Any conclusions derived from such an approach 
seem of little relevance. The discussions in this chapter will show that Freeman’s 
interpretation might not be important to Rawls’s own argument. 
 Thus far I have argued that it seems both unacceptable and unlikely that liberal 
peoples would choose to constrain their list of human rights because some peoples or persons 
would reject core liberal assumptions. I have also rejected the view that the representatives for 
liberal peoples in the original position should be modeled without reference to their belief that 
liberal rights are universal in their normative force. In this chapter I discuss Reidy’s (2006) 
proposed justification for Rawls’s list of human rights, which does not rely on any of these 
interpretations of LP. 
8.1 The Relationship Between Reciprocity and Self-
Determination 
Building on the criterion of reciprocity as well as the value Rawls puts on a people’s self-
determination, Reidy (2006, 177) develops what he calls a “Rawlsian justification” of Rawls’s 
narrow conception of human rights. The criterion of reciprocity requires those proposing a 
                                                
34 Stating that the representatives in the second-level original position(s) should be modelled as exclusively self-
interested. 
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particular set of rules to think it at least reasonable for others to accept them (Rawls 1999b, 
136-137). Decent peoples might reject liberal human rights because of their non-liberal 
beliefs, but since decent peoples deny that persons should be treated as free and equal, then 
their reasons for this rejection would not really be reasonable. As shown earlier, the idea of 
making concessions to the conceptions of morality in non-liberal societies is not a compelling 
argument for narrowing a doctrine of human rights, and certainly not one liberal peoples 
would make. The criterion of reciprocity does not change this. 
Reidy’s interpretation of Rawls supports the idea that Rawls does not let liberal 
peoples make concessions to the moral point of view of decent non-liberal peoples in order to 
come up with merely a basic list of human rights. Furthermore, Reidy’s defense of Rawls 
suggests that such concessions are not necessary to justify the choice of basic human rights in 
the Law of Peoples. Reidy’s argument is that given the basis of liberal people’s proper 
patriotism35, and given the fact that violations of human rights in Rawls’s framework allows 
for coercive sanctioning to rectify such violation, it would be unreasonable of liberal peoples 
to list liberal rights as human rights (Reidy 2006, 177-185). Reidy (2006, 179) notes that 
given the role of Rawsian human rights, the consequences of applying a list of human rights 
that requires basic liberal rights such as democracy, freedom of speech and non-
discrimination is that polities that violate such rights would be denied self-determination. One 
might argue that although this is true, the question of why this should be seen as a problem 
remains. Two main points could be made in relation to this response.  
Firstly, just because coercive sanctioning is justified in principle, its implementation 
would depend on other variables. The most pressing variable is whether the implementation is 
likely to cause human suffering, or lead to actual and stable reform. For instance, one might 
plausibly argue that the aspects of contemporary American foreign policy that involve the use 
of war to forcibly influence non-democratic states towards democracy fail in both these 
respects. Thus, it is important to note that even if we endorse the most inclusive list of human 
rights, foreign policy initiatives even remotely resembling for instance the Iraqi war are not 
necessarily warranted just because we work under the assumption that human rights 
violations, in principle, justify the use of coercive sanctions. 
Secondly, based on the lack of internal justice and political legitimacy in societies that 
violate important liberal rights, there seems to be good reason to allow for the usage of 
                                                
35 “This interest is a people’s proper self-respect of themselves as a people, resting on their common awareness 
of their trials during their history and of their culture with its accomplishments” (Rawls 1999b, 34). Rawls sees 
this as one of the fundamental interests of peoples. 
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coercive sanctions, when such sanctions would not defeat its own purpose, not involve 
violation of other, more urgent human rights, and have positive effects in the form of 
achieving steps towards liberal reform. 
 Reidy’s (2006, 180) argument however, is that some introspection by liberal peoples 
would lead to the realization that they themselves (or liberal peoples in general) at one point 
in development did not either respect the rights to equal participation, freedom of speech and 
non-discrimination. Furthermore, they regard their own domestic orders as their own 
achievement and as a great source of pride. Reidy argues that they feel this way at least partly 
because they were free to liberalize in their own way and on their own time. Therefore when 
developing the principles of international justice, liberal peoples are compelled to take into 
account their own self-understanding and the historical basis of their proper self-respect. 
When deciding what set of human rights defines the cut that justifies a denial of self-
determination, they would not only be interested in whether the internal justice of other 
societies matches their own convictions. They would question at what (perhaps hypothetical) 
point in their own historical development would their own level of internal justice justify 
forceful intervention and denial of self-determination. Since their own sense of achievement 
and proper self-respect comes from their own achievements of liberalization and 
democratization, and they recognize this self-respect as fundamental to their interests, it 
would be unreasonable to deny all other, presently non-liberal peoples, the ability to go 
through the same developments on their own terms.  
 Reidy (2006, 177) accepts that Rawls does not provide a thorough justification for his 
list of human rights. However he argues that Rawls does much to suggest the justification 
Reidy develops. There is little doubt that reciprocity is a central idea for Rawls. Furthermore, 
at several points Rawls emphasizes the importance of self-determination: 
  
(…) [S]elf-determination, duly constrained by appropriate conditions, is an important 
good for a people (…) the foreign policy of liberal peoples should recognize that good 
and not take on the appearance of being coercive. Decent societies should have the 
opportunity to decide their future for themselves (Rawls 1999b, 85). 
 
 According to Reidy (2006, 180), the question we should ask ourselves is the 
following: “What could all liberal democratic peoples agree to as minimally sufficient to 
justify their own claimed right to self-determination and non-intervention?” Reidy (2006, 
183) concludes that a polity organized as a viable constitutional republic would satisfy this 
requirement from the point of view of liberal peoples. Human rights, on this reading would be 
60 
 
only those that are “(…) essential to a well-ordered constitutional republican form of 
government” (Reidy 2006, 183). As such, they will not include “(…) general rights to 
democratic political processes or nondiscrimination” (Reidy 2006, 183). Therefore the 
justification for the narrow conception of human rights is that it is consistent with a liberal 
people’s own sense of self-respect and their own claim to self-determination. Reidy argues 
that the past processes of democratization and liberalization form an important part of this 
proper patriotism. Liberal peoples would not accept that they, if possible, could have been 
denied self-determination when they where at a point in their development where they 
respected Rawls’s list of human rights, but not a list including basic liberal rights. 
Consequently, they would regard it as unreasonable to deny similar terms to societies that 
have not yet reached the level of development of liberal peoples. Reidy (2006, 180-181) 
argues that in decent societies the members are bound to one another and to their body politic 
in a morally significant way. I have argued that several aspects of a decent society mean that 
the wielders of power are not morally justified in enforcing their laws. However, this does not 
mean that their authority is without moral significance. 
 Reidy offers, in my opinion, a plausible justification for why the list of international 
enforceable human rights is constrained to the basic. While the argument that a list of human 
rights must make concessions to the moral points of views of decent peoples involves an 
unappealing moral relativism, the argument from self-determination is not in conflict with the 
idea of the moral universality of political liberalism. Liberal peoples might still argue and 
believe that while they extend to some non-liberal peoples the privilege of self-determination, 
the members of such societies still have a right to live in a liberal democracy. Liberal peoples 
are in their rights to voice critical objections to non-liberal peoples based on for instance 
political liberalism (Rawls 1999b, 84; Reidy 2006, 184). So even though liberal peoples 
recognize that some decent, non-liberal peoples deserve self-determination and should be 
given the status of equal participating members of the Society of Peoples, they can rightly 
criticize such peoples for failing to provide their members with the rights that justice that 
liberal peoples believe internal legitimacy demands. 
 Nevertheless, some challenges might be made against Reidy’s defense of Rawlsian 
human rights. In the next sections I discuss some of these. Furthermore, the next chapter 
challenges one of its fundamental assumptions. 
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8.2 An Overvaluing of Self-Determination? 
One might object to Reidy’s defence of Rawls by arguing that it puts too great a value on self-
determination. For instance, assume that a well-ordered decent society would democratize and 
liberalize fully in the space of 20 years via the use of coercive sanctioning (diplomatic, 
economic or military). Additionally, further assume that without intervention and with 
recognition, the same process would take 200 years. Such scenarios are possible within the 
scope of Reidy’s argument, thus seemingly overvaluing the virtues of self-determination.  
 The strength of a cosmopolitan alternative is that can be sensitive to such scenarios. 
Cosmopolitans will only use coercive measures if such measures would lead to liberal reform. 
If self-determination is important to a particular people, then coercive measures are likely to 
have the opposite effect. Therefore the cosmopolitan foreign policy would refrain from 
sanctioning that society. Rawls’s (1999b, 62) view is that decent peoples are more likely to 
reform if treated as equals by liberal peoples. He fails to substantiate this claim with empirical 
evidence yet the idea has a degree of intuitive plausibility. This stems from the idea that states 
branded as “outlaw” without being granted recognition might then become bitter and resentful 
(Rawls 1999b, 61). However, since Rawls includes decent societies in ideal theory, then from 
the point of view of international justice, it does not strictly matter whether decent peoples 
liberalize in the space of a year or whether they never change. Huseby (2007, 254) notes that 
according to Rawls, liberal peoples should not apply coercive sanction even if such sanctions 
would a) lead to liberal reform, and b) not jeopardize world peace, and c) not be the cause of 
any human suffering. This seems to give a full appreciation of how committed Rawls is to the 
value of self-determination. 
When compared to the cosmopolitan approach, which only would violate the self-
determination of a decent people if this violation would lead to liberal reform in a way that 
does not lead to further violation of urgent human rights, Rawls’s valuing of self-
determination seems too extensive. Alternatively, one can say that Rawls’s theory relies on 
the empirical premise that decent peoples would evolve in a liberal direction if allowed to do 
so without coercive interference.36 A more precise formulation of this premise is the 
following: Decent peoples would not reform significantly more effectively by the use of 
                                                
36 Alyssa Bernstein (2006, 292) makes this point, and adds that this premise seems defensible. 
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coercive sanctions than by the use of non-coercive measures in cases where coercive 
sanctions can be applied without leading to violation of more urgent human rights. If Rawls 
indeed relies on this premise and it could be shown to be wrong, then Rawls, or his 
supporters, would have to concede that his theory needed adjustment. 
8.3 The Role of Reciprocity 
Reidy might argue that the discussion in the section above overlooks the role of reciprocity in 
Rawls’s framework. On this view questions regarding the efficiency that self-determination 
has on democratization are of little importance. Rather, the important question for Rawls’s 
purposes is at what level of internal justice liberal peoples would argue they themselves 
would deserve recognition. Furthermore, that Rawls is right that this level corresponds with 
what Reidy calls a viable constitutional republic. 
 It might seem reasonable that liberal peoples would argue that they would deserve 
recognition even in a point of history where they did not truly honour liberal rights. However 
one of the problems with this argument is that the level of internal justice liberal peoples 
would select as the basis for their own claims to self-determination could be influenced by a 
selection bias problem. All liberal peoples did in fact evolve into liberal peoples, and if they 
were to assess their own claims to self-determination to set terms for other societies’ rights to 
self-determination, they might be influenced by this knowledge. If liberal peoples knew that 
self-determination for a particular type of decent people is unlikely to lead to democratization, 
then they might think twice about extending it.  
A central argument for Reidy is that one does not have to go far back in the history of 
contemporary liberal states to find practices that would not be compatible with a list of human 
rights that included liberal rights. 
  
(…) [S]tates not yet fulfilling the specified basic human rights, those without universal 
suffrage or with gender or religious restrictions on eligibility for public office, would 
be denied equal standing within the international order as a moral order. They would 
not have a right to self-determination and nonintervention (…). At the end of the 
nineteenth century, then, England and the United States would have had no right 
against coercive or forceful intervention, diplomatic, economic or perhaps even 
military, by other states keen to see that women got the right to vote (Reidy 2006, 
179). 
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 This compels the representatives of liberal peoples in the second-level original 
position to specify where they ground their own rights to self-determination. It seems 
plausible that they would not include many of the rights they otherwise believe are universal. 
However, my point is that their choice might be influenced by the knowledge that the people 
they represent in fact have been successful in finding their own paths to become liberal 
peoples. At least part of the reason why liberal peoples would not see their own claims to self-
determination as grounded in their liberal laws could be that they in fact made the transition 
from a less developed stage into liberal democracies. Therefore, when liberal peoples decide 
what kinds of societies are worthy of self-determination, it seems that they should consider 
the possibility that some decent non-liberal peoples that are extended self-determination are 
organized in a way which means they would severely struggle to find the same path as liberal 
peoples have done. Some decent peoples might never, or only on a very long time 
perspective, become liberal democracies. This might not lead to a different list of human 
rights than Rawls’s, but it could lead to slightly different conclusions concerning toleration of 
certain types of decent well-ordered peoples as equal participating members of the Society of 
Peoples37. 
 The objections I have discussed in the latter part of this chapter are less severe than the 
objections I have raised to the argument that a list of human rights must be acceptable to the 
moral beliefs of decent peoples and Freeman’s argument that Rawls’s list of human rights can 
be justified by modeling representatives of liberal peoples as exclusively self-interested. I 
think Reidy develops quite a plausible defense of Rawls’s short list of human rights - one that 
is firmly connected to what Rawls himself writes in LP. Nevertheless I have argued that it has 
some problematic features. Firstly it might depend on the empirical premise that decent 
peoples would not reform significantly more effectively by the use of coercive sanctions than 
by the use of non-coercive measures in cases where coercive sanctions can be applied without 
leading to violation of more urgent human rights. This premise seems defendable. However if 
it fails, then the use of a fuller list of human rights that in principle allow coercive sanctions 
might be warranted. Reidy might argue that this premise is not important for Rawls’s list of 
human rights, because liberal peoples are only tasked with specifying at what level of 
                                                
37 For example it might be argued that the totalitarian features of “Kazanistan” – Rawls’s hypothetical example 
of a decent society – render its institutions static. If the basic political institutions of a society in itself are 
religious, for instance in a society run by a priesthood (still in the form of Rawls’s consultational hierarchy), then 
the suspicion that the static nature of absolutistic forms of government might endure, and stifle attempts of 
reform, could lead liberal peoples to think twice about treating them as equal participating members of the 
Society of Peoples, although they might still withhold forceful sanctions. 
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development they would endorse their own claims to self-determination. This response could 
lead to a second problematic feature. This is that Reidy’s justification of Rawlsian human 
rights might be associated with a selection bias. 
 There is another fundamental and possibly problematic feature with Rawls’s list of 
human rights that Reidy’s defence relies on, which has yet to be discussed. This is the 
assumption that when a theory of international justice is developed, the role of human rights 
should be to specify when coercive sanctioning can be allowed. This is an important point, 
which will be discussed in greater depth within the next chapter. 
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9 Should the Role of the Human 
Rights Principle be to Specify when 
Coercive Sanctions are allowed? 
Reidy’s defence of Rawls rests on one fundamental assumption. Namely that human rights 
violation should be seen, at least in principle, as grounds for coercive sanctioning. If human 
rights were not seen this way, they would not directly conflict with the value of self-
determination. But is this direct link between human rights and coercive sanctions, which 
Rawls relies on, plausible? Without this link there is no reason for the representatives of 
liberal peoples in the original position to tailor human rights around set requirements for self-
determination. The role of human rights Rawls seems to endorse exerts, according to John 
Tasioulas (20002, 384) “(…) additional, largely unacknowledged pressure to keep the list of 
human rights minimal”. I think it is true that the role of human rights in LP constrains the 
selection of said rights (at least if we favour Reidy’s proposed justification over for instance 
Freeman’s). However the question of whether this is problematic or not arises. 
I think there are two ways to go about arguing that the relationship between 
intervention and human rights in LP is implausible. The first criticizes Rawls for not taking 
into account the contemporary understanding of the role of human rights. The second argues 
that the justifications for why a theory holds that a right is a human right should be made 
wholly independent of any reasons that might exist for not coercively implementing it on 
another society. 
9.1 Rawlsian Human Rights Versus the 
Contemporary Understanding 
Charles Beitz (2000, 684) argues that Rawls’s use of human rights defies the conventional 
understanding of such rights. He points out that human rights in fact play a broad political 
role, for instance they serve as foundations for claims individuals can make against their 
governments, or as grounds for political action by NGOs. Furthermore he (2000, 687) writes: 
  
(…) [H]uman rights serve not only as minimum conditions for international 
recognition, but also, as the declaration’s preamble puts it, “as a common standard of 
achievement” for the guidance of “every individual and organ of society.” 
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The conventional understanding then, of human rights is as “shared goals of political reform”, 
serving as focal points for NGOs and social movements within non-democratic states (Beitz 
2002, 687-688). I think Beitz’s argument is a good one. However, it is not clear that this 
understanding is ruled out by Rawls’s framework. The Law of Peoples guides the foreign 
policy of the members of the Society of Peoples, not the standards that social movements in 
non-democratic states should use as focal points. The Law of Peoples does not deny the 
universality of liberalism. It only denies forceful liberalization of decent peoples.  
Rawls’s claim that some of the contemporary human rights are liberal aspirations and 
some are proper human rights might at first sound outrageous to most liberals, as he seems to 
be saying that liberal justice is not universally valid. This view relegates liberalism to a 
question of taste, when in fact liberal peoples would rightly hold that it consists of a set of 
principles with universal applicability (Huseby 2007, 255). In my opinion the right 
interpretation of Rawls’s comment is not that he says that all individuals do not have a claim 
on these rights in their relation with the wielders of power in their society (Reidy 2006, 181). 
Rather, he does not think that they are rights that liberal peoples can force decent peoples to 
apply. On this understanding, all the rights of the UDHR, both urgent and liberal, can still be 
understood as human rights by liberal peoples, or by groupings within decent or other non-
liberal societies, and thus perform the role Beitz is calling for. However, since they are not 
urgent enough to warrant enforcement across borders (or so Rawls claims), they are not 
“internationally enforceable basic human rights”38. 
It might still be argued though, that Rawls’s theory should not simply allow for a 
contemporary understanding of human rights. Rather, it should properly integrate such an 
understanding into the theory. This is a valid claim and I address it in the next section, as part 
of a response to Tasioulas’s claim that Rawls confounds issues of ideal and non-ideal theory. 
9.2 The Cut Between Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory 
Because Rawls in LP sees only those rights that if violated in principle justify coercive 
sanctioning, as human rights proper, Tasilouas (2002, 385-386) claims that Rawls confounds 
issues of ideal and non-ideal theory39. The reasoning behind this claim is the argument that 
                                                
38 This term is borrowed from Alyssa Bernstein (2006, 281). 
39 Wilfried Hinsch and Markus Stepanians (2006, 127-128) discuss Tasioulas’s article. However their arguments 
are different to the ones I present in this chapter. 
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the close connection between Rawlsian human rights and coercive sanctioning implies that 
the list of proper human rights is likely to be shorter than just those rights every individual in 
fact have a claim to. According to Tasioulas (2002, 385) ideal international theory must begin 
with the question of what rights everyone ideally should have. A similar point is made by 
Alistair M. Macleod (2006, 137) who writes that there are grounds for suggesting that Rawls 
confounds justification and enforcement issues on human rights at important junctures. 
Furthermore that this is evident in his recognition of human rights as only those that, in 
principle, warrant coercive measures for enforcement. 
 Tasioulas (2002, 385) argues that, in a theory of international justice, the question 
“What is the list of human rights that ideally (…) should be recognized?” should be separated 
from other questions. These include such questions as what human rights should be part of 
international law, or what should be the responses to violations. According to Tasioulas, the 
answer to the first question should define ideal international theory. His own view seems to be 
that ideal theory should be a world of only liberal peoples. On his understanding 
considerations relating to intervention, sanctions and toleration should be part of non-ideal 
theory. For example, one might argue that decent peoples should be tolerated, without making 
them part of ideal theory (2002, 390). 
 
(…) [N]othing in Rawls’ argument from respect or toleration shows why we should 
refrain from attributing a universal scope to a fully reasonable – i.e. liberal, assuming 
that is what it is – conception of justice. We could still, compatibly with this argument, 
carry on ‘tolerating’ decent societies (Tasioulas 2002, 389-390). 
 
 The Law of Peoples does not deny the universality of liberal justice. However, its role 
is not to specify the full principles of internal justice and legitimacy in societies that are not 
liberal. Its role seems to be to establish the principles that should guide international relations. 
Tasioulas seemingly does not appreciate this. He appears to identify what is ideal theory 
within domestic societies, as one and the same as ideal theory in international theory. This 
becomes evident with his argument that the ideal standards of international justice specify that 
all peoples are liberal and that this is separate from any measures used to achieve this goal. At 
the same time he (2002, 387) agrees that concerns for self-determination and responsibility 
might rule out coercive measures. In fact he seems quite sympathetic to Rawls’s arguments. 
But if ideas such as self-determination should lead liberal peoples to tolerate some types of 
non-liberal peoples and thereby extend them recognitional legitimacy, then the further 
concerns Tasioulas has for the internal justice of decent societies does not really seem to 
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necessarily be the subject of a theory of international justice. Rather, such concerns could 
belong to a theory of domestic justice. In fact it seems that it is Tasioulas himself who 
confounds issues. Not issues of ideal and non-ideal theory, but those of domestic and 
international justice.40 
9.3 Incorporating Non-Coercive measures to the 
theory 
Tasioulas’s (2002, 387-388) argues that Rawls’s framework “(…) eliminates any grounds for 
criticizing (…) non-liberal societies for violating putatively universally applicable human 
rights norms”.41 This reading of Rawls seems to contradict the comments Rawls (1999b, 84) 
makes that liberal peoples are within their rights to criticize decent peoples for not being 
liberal42. If we were to acknowledge this remark by Rawls however, and assume that liberal 
peoples could, and indeed should, use non-coercive measures such as critical remarks in order 
to try to influence the unjust policies of decent peoples, then that could in fact suggest a 
different ideal theory goal than the one Rawls develops in LP. Such critical remarks, or other 
non-coercive measures that Rawls would allow, are doubtlessly part of international relations. 
In fact, they might be more important parts of international relations than those measures 
highlighted in Rawls’s theory. James W. Nickel (2006, 270-273) makes a good case for this 
argument. He shows that measures in international relations aimed at implementing human 
rights rarely consists of coercive sanctions.  
 
Let’s call criticism and condemnation of other countries that is not accompanied by 
significant threats “jawboning”. (…) jawboning is the most common means of 
promoting human rights across international borders (Nickel 2006, 271). 
 
                                                
40 One might respond to this by arguing that Rawls does not provide a theory of internal legitimacy and justice 
for a non-liberal society because his domestic theory is intended for a constitutional democracy. However, 
because the Law of Peoples is a theory that stipulates where the level of recognitional legitimacy should go, and 
not a theory stipulating justice or internal legitimacy in nondemocratic societies, it can successfully be 
indifferent to whether a society is liberal or decent, without relying on the claim that decent peoples are 
internally legitimate. 
41 By putatively universally applicable human rights norms, Tasioulas presumably means such rights as those 
Rawls identifies as liberal aspirations like democracy, full freedom of speech, and non-discrimination. 
42 Rawls’s (1999b, 84) wording is the following: ”Critical objections, based either on political liberalism, or on 
comprehensive doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, will continue concerning this and all other matters. 
Raising these objections is the right of liberal peoples and is fully consistent with the liberties and integrity of 
decent hierarchical societies”. 
69 
 
Rawls’s framework allows a variety of non-coercive measures to implement liberal 
human rights in non-liberal societies. “Jawboning” is likely to be one of these. It is likely that 
non-coercive measures are at least as important as coercive measures when it comes to 
implementing human rights. Therefore it seems curious that the possibility of non-coercive 
measures aimed at liberalizing decent peoples play no part in stipulating the difference 
between ideal and non-ideal theory. 
For Rawls the difference between the relevance of domestic and international theory 
goes with recognitional legitimacy, which as outlined earlier, seems to be found by making a 
compromise between liberal justice and self-determination. Once ideal international theory 
allows for and recognizes the self-determination of a particular people, then further questions 
about the internal justice of this people become the subject matter of a domestic theory of 
legitimacy and justice. There seems to be little basis, in my opinion, in the characterization of 
this cut by Rawls as a theoretical mistake, which is what Tasioulas’s (2002, 390) argument 
amounts to.  
Even though I believe Tasioulas is wrong to call Rawls’s distinction between ideal and 
non-ideal theory a mistake, I think an argument can be made that Tasioulas’s alternative 
distinction is superior to Rawls’s. The problem with Rawls’s distinction is that the theory 
excludes what are arguably the most important measures aimed at achieving justice in non-
liberal societies, namely those that are non-coercive. Since Rawls is dealing with justice in 
international relations, and non-coercive measures aimed at liberalizing non-liberal societies 
should be an integral part of liberal peoples’ foreign policy, then it seems his international 
theory should incorporate such measures, instead of simply allowing for them. If incorporated 
the alternative theory could state that liberal peoples should apply non-coercive measures on 
decent peoples until they are fully liberalized. Ideal theory would in this case be a world of 
only liberal peoples, even though decent peoples are extended recognitional legitimacy. 
In this chapter I have argued that Rawls’s decision to only include as human rights 
those that he deems as internationally enforceable, stands up reasonably well against 
criticism. First, although Rawls calls many of the rights in the UDHR for liberal aspirations, 
and not proper human rights, the Law of Peoples does not say that these liberal aspirational 
human rights cannot play the role they do in contemporary international relations. Second, the 
claim that Rawls confounds issues of ideal and non-ideal theory fails because LP is concerned 
with ideal theory in international relations, not ideal theory within a domestic society. 
However, if Rawls incorporated non-coercive measures into the theory instead of only 
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discussing coercive measures, the result could be a more ambitious and perhaps more 
plausible conception of ideal theory. An argument could be made in favour of incorporating 
non-coercive measures to the theory because such measures should be important parts of a 
liberal foreign policy. 
In chapter 11 where I address the question of how Rawls’s theory may be adjusted in a 
way that affords added normative force to positive duties, I develop a theory that includes 
non-coercive measures. Before I proceed with this chapter however, I clarify the extent that 
liberal cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples differ. Here I claim that the two positions are 
not mutually exclusive as some suggest. In fact, to a certain degree the Law of Peoples can 
operate within a larger liberal cosmopolitan theory. 
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10  The Law of Peoples Versus Liberal 
Cosmopolitanism? 
Liberal cosmopolitanism might entail many different judgements about what international 
justice consists of. However, when I use the term am referring to a set of beliefs about 
international and domestic justice that entail two main judgements: 1. Any state must be a 
liberal democracy for there to be internal political legitimacy in that state. The fact that the 
predominant culture attached to a specific society is dominated by beliefs that say democracy 
is not for them does not change this. 2. An overarching goal of the foreign policy of liberal 
peoples should be to spread liberal reforms, and therefore political legitimacy, to all states. 
The minimally acceptable ideal world of a liberal cosmopolitan is one where all states are 
liberal democracies. This is a world where all individuals enjoy important liberal rights. In 
this chapter I will claim that these two beliefs are possible to combine with the Law of 
Peoples. In order to do this I draw upon arguments made in preceding chapters. Chapter 5 and 
chapter 9 are central in this respect. 
10.1  Internal Political Legitimacy 
In a critical review of LP, Pogge writes the following: 
 
(…) [I]f  liberal and decent hierarchical societies really are morally on an equal 
footing, then should not our move from a liberal to a decent regime be just as 
acceptable as our previous opposite move was, or as Iran’s now would be (Pogge 
2001, 247)? 
 
It is true that the Law of Peoples is indifferent to whether a society is organized as a liberal or 
a decent people. However, the Law of Peoples is only Rawls’s international theory. If a liberal 
society reformed to a decent one, the moral implications of this is the proper domain of 
domestic theory. Obviously, a liberal people that reformed into a decent people would not be 
indifferent from the point of view of Rawls’s domestic theory. As the Law of Peoples only 
focuses on recognitional legitimacy, its equal treatment of decent and liberal peoples is 
possible to combine the belief that all states should be organized as liberal democracies for 
there to be internal political legitimacy. 
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 The liberal cosmopolitan idea of internal political legitimacy then, is compatible with 
the Law of Peoples. It might seem that Rawls’s theories are agnostic to what internal 
legitimacy requires in non-liberal societies because in PL Rawls (1993, 137) only formulates 
a liberal principle of legitimacy. However, in a revised version of the principle, Rawls 
(1999b, 137) simply refers to it as an “(…) idea of political legitimacy”. However, whether 
Rawls’s theories are agnostic or not regarding the issue of whether other standards of internal 
political legitimacy apply in non-liberal societies than in liberal societies, is not the issue here. 
I only say that Rawls never commits to a statement that claims there is internal legitimacy 
within decent societies. If he did, then I do not think that liberal peoples could accept the Law 
of Peoples because it would rely on a morally relativistic argument that betrays their most 
basic assumptions. The question of internal legitimacy however, is not the most important one 
when relating the Law of Peoples to liberal cosmopolitanism. The most important question is 
that of recognitional legitimacy, and its relationship to the ideal of a world consisting of soley 
liberal democracies. 
10.2  Recogntion and the Foreign Policy Goal of a 
World of Liberal Democracies 
Huseby (2007, 253) makes a similar argument to that of Pogge and claims that the Law of 
Peoples cannot be a liberal theory of international justice. 
 
Liberalism as such cannot accept the curtailment of individuals’ right to free speech. If 
liberals do accept this, they must rely on pragmatic and moral reasons other than those 
that follow from liberalism. And although this might be reasonable, the resulting 
conception would not be an instance of ideal liberal theory. 
 
 I believe Huseby has a valid point when he writes that in order for liberals to accept 
decent peoples, they must rely on other moral reasons than those that follow from liberalism 
itself. However, I disagree with Huseby (2007, 250-252) when he argues that the decision to 
tolerate decent peoples is incompatible with liberalism. Rawls sees the value of the self-
determination of a people as overriding a liberal people’s concern over the lack of internal 
justice in decent peoples. This judgement is not obviously inherent in liberalism itself. 
However, it is not at odds with the idea that political legitimacy demands liberal institutions. 
Furthermore, the degree to which Rawls thinks the value of self-determination overrides 
concerns over liberal justice stops at recognition as equal members of the Society of Peoples. 
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This means that the Law of Peoples allows liberal peoples to do all in their power, short of 
violating the recognitional legitimacy of decent peoples, to try to liberalize such peoples. The 
value that Rawls believes liberal peoples should put on the self-determination of decent 
peoples does therefore not contradict the liberal aim of a world of only democratic states. 
Liberal cosmopolitans generally argue that because there is not political legitimacy in 
any type of non-liberal state, such states might be the object of sanction. However, while the 
judgement of the moral illegitimacy of a regime is a necessary condition for coercive 
intervention according to the liberal cosmopolitan, it is obviously not a sufficient justification. 
Especially when referring to military measures (Tan 2005, 702). Since there might be reasons 
for not allowing coercive measures, liberal cosmopolitans have an arsenal of non-coercive 
measures at their disposal to assist in achieving the goal of a world of liberal democracies: 
 
Active critical engagement, political negotiations, and trade incentives (and even 
disincentives under appropriate conditions) are obvious non-military alternatives to 
realizing cosmopolitan ends without resort to force. The active and organized use of 
what Joseph Nye calls ‘soft power’ – education, intellectual exchanges, cultural 
dissemination, and so on – to encourage nonliberal states to come to appreciate liberal 
values is another peaceful and co-operative method of encouraging liberal reforms in 
nonliberal societies that cosmopolitans can endorse (Tan 2005, 703). 
 
What is interesting about the measures listed above is that only the one concerning 
economic incentives is ruled out in the Law of Peoples43. Non-coercive, co-operative 
measures based on encouragement, as well as criticism is not at odds with Rawls’s conception 
of international justice. In fact he seems to presuppose their presence (Rawls 1999b, 61, 84). 
It can therefore be concluded that the liberal foreign policy goal of a world of only liberal 
democracies is compatible with the Law of Peoples. 
Assume that Juliet believes that all states must respect central liberal principles for 
there to be internal political legitimacy. Furthermore she aspires to a world where all societies 
are internally legitimate. She also believes that liberal peoples should make use of any soft 
power and non-coercive measures available to them in order to liberalize decent peoples. 
                                                
43 The argument that liberal peoples should not offer decent non-liberal peoples economic incentives to make 
liberal democratic reform is not put forward very strongly by Rawls. Rawls writes that persons in civil society 
might raise private funds for this purpose. Rawls is concerned that the duty of assistance is more pressing than 
subsidizing liberal reform in decent societies where basic human rights are protected. Furthermore, he seems 
primarily concerned that incentives within a Society of Peoples would lead to serious conflict. These concerns 
seem to be pragmatic and not moral (Rawls 1999b, 84-85). Therefore one might argue that if situations were 
these concerns are not warranted were to appear, then Rawls would accept the use of economic incentives to 
encourage liberalization. 
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However, because she holds the self-determination of a people to be an important good, she 
thinks that decent peoples should not be forced to liberalize. This is not a pragmatic 
judgement. For example, it is not the result of a belief that coercive measures are dangerous 
and rarely accomplish anything. Holding this set of beliefs, she should be ready to accept 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples. However, Juliet seems to also be a liberal cosmopolitan. She thinks 
political legitimacy demands liberal democracy. Furthermore, she believes that an overall 
goal of the foreign policy of liberal peoples should be to work actively to reform all states 
accordingly. This example illustrates the large overlap between the liberal cosmopolitan view 
and that of Rawlsian international theory. The two schools of thought are not as contradictory 
as often suggested. 
This chapter has showed that a liberal cosmopolitan need not concede her beliefs 
about internal legitimacy in order to endorse the Law of Peoples. Only recognitional 
legitimacy becomes the contested issue. Rawls relies on the value of self-determination in 
order to justify that recognitional legitimacy should not follow from an account of internal 
legitimacy. However the important point is that while decent peoples are extended 
recognitional legitimacy, an arsenal of non-coercive measures might be used by liberal 
peoples with the goal of achieving a world of liberal democracies. The Law of Peoples does 
not address these non-coercive measures44, but it is compatible with their implementation. To 
the extent that liberal cosmopolitans would tend to agree with Rawls’s judgements on how the 
value of self-determination overrides issues concerning the lack of internal political 
legitimacy in decent peoples, the Law of Peoples could be seen as operating within a larger 
liberal cosmopolitan thesis of international justice. 
 The discussions in the last two chapters build towards the next chapter. Within it, I 
sketch a theory of international justice that combines several intuitions of liberal 
cosmopolitanism and the main judgements as well as the general approach of Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples. In doing so, I address the second question I set out to answer in this thesis, namely 
how Rawls’s theory can be adjusted in a way that affords added normative force to the idea of 
positive duties across societies. 
                                                
44 I argued in chapter 9 that this is a weakness of Rawls’s theory. Therefore it is one of the issues addressed in 
chapter 11 where I propose an alternative Rawlsian theory of international justice. Including non-coercive 
measures in the theory leads to a more ambitious cut between non-ideal and ideal theory than the one Rawls 
sketches in LP. 
75 
 
11  An attempt at Reformulation: A 
“Rawlsian” Liberal Cosmopolitan 
Theory of International Justice 
In this chapter I sketch a theory of international justice, which builds on the Law of Peoples 
and affords added normative force to the idea of positive duties across societies. I assume that 
for there to be internal legitimacy in any polity, it must be governed by a liberal democracy45. 
I have earlier argued that this judgement does not contradict what Rawls writes in LP because 
the idea of decency is exclusively concerned with the question of recognitional legitimacy. I 
take internal political legitimacy to mean that the wielders of power in the society in question 
are morally justified in enforcing their laws (Buchanan 2004, 233). 
 After I have sketched my proposed theory of international justice, I consider the merits 
and problems associated with it. 
11.1  The problem with International Positive Duties 
In the introduction, I posed two main questions. The second was the following: 
 
(2) Bearing in mind the criticisms of Rawls’s conception of human rights identified in 
the treatment of question (1), how can The Law of Peoples be adjusted in a way that 
affords added normative force to the idea of positive duties across societies? 
 
 In an article largely sympathetic of Rawls’s position in LP, Pettit (2006, 54) notes that 
the only real weakness of the theory is at the point where thinkers of a more cosmopolitan 
egalitarian persuasion tend to agree with him:  
  
If there is a weakness in Rawls’s schema it shows up, ironically, with the principles on 
which radical cosmopolitans are likely to agree rather than disagree: namely, that well-
                                                
45 This follows Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy from PL. The intuitive appeal of this assumption rests on 
the idea that internal legitimacy demands a certain commitment to justice, and that justice demands liberalism 
(Buchanan 2004, 247). The claim that internal legitimacy demands liberalism is furthermore based on an 
assumption of favourable conditions making liberal democracy possible to sustain. If such favourable conditions 
are not assumed and liberal democracy is impossible to sustain (for instance due to a severe lack of resources), 
then some more primitive form of governance might be morally acceptable. Rawls (1999b, 108) argues that there 
is basically no society in the world with so few resources that it could not sustain well-ordered institutions if 
given the chance by the duty of assistance, 
76 
 
ordered peoples should help those who live under oppressive and burdened regimes. 
For if those in the second original position represent only well-ordered societies, and 
not individuals across all societies, then it is unclear why they would have a rational 
motive for endorsing such altruism. 
 
In my discussion of Freeman’s defence of Rawls’s list of human rights, I argued that it 
is not plausible to model the representatives of liberal peoples as strictly rational self-
interested, because all liberal peoples would be fundamentally concerned about the universal 
value of urgent human rights as well as the universal value of liberal democratic rights. These 
beliefs should be attached to the very nature of a liberal people. The selection of the human 
rights principle in itself is not, however, the subject of Pettit’s argument for a weakness in 
Rawls’s framework. More precisely, Pettit questions the willingness of the representatives in 
the original positions to endorse principles that involve altruistic duties. One question 
concerns the will to implement coercive sanctions against oppressive regimes. However, 
Rawls never states that there is a duty on the members of the Society of Peoples to implement 
coercive sanctions. Human rights violation simply justifies such measures. There seems to be 
little case then, for liberal peoples to not endorse the human rights principle. 
Therefore the problem resides with the duty of assistance. While the other principles 
of the Law of Peoples would seemingly not involve drastic changes to the current state of 
international relations, the duty of assistance, if acted upon, would. As such, it is the most 
progressive principle for Rawls. Assume that we accept that LP gives a full account of what 
international justice means. We then compare the current state of liberal foreign policies with 
those LP professes. It seems likely that the duty of assistance is the principle that most 
pressingly demands reform. For the non-ideal world in which liberal foreign policies exist in 
at this point in time, the duty of assistance then, is arguably the most important part of the 
Law of Peoples. However, the original position argument Rawls utilises does not show why 
this principle should be selected. 
 
It is hard to see how such a duty could be derived from the apparatus of the global 
original position, given that the main beneficiaries of the principle are not even 
represented there, and that beneficence is not included as a motivation of the 
representatives who select the principles (Costa 2005, 53). 
 
I agree with Pettit and Costa that this is a weakness in Rawls’s theory. Furthermore, I 
think that only an original position where the interests of individuals in all the societies in the 
77 
 
world are present can show why the representatives of liberal peoples would endorse the duty 
of assistance. 
Three assumptions underline my claim that the duty of assistance is problematic for 
Rawls’s theory on international justice: (1) The principles of international justice are to be 
identified through the use of a second-level original position with representatives of liberal 
peoples. (2) Such representatives are unlikely to impose the duty of assistance on themselves. 
Put together these two assumptions bring the conclusion that the principles of international 
justice do not include Rawls’s duty of assistance. The third assumption is that (3) a Law of 
Peoples that does not include the duty of assistance fails to give a plausible account of 
international justice. 
I think these are reasonable assumptions to make, however the point of this chapter is 
not to defend these assumptions, but to show how Rawls’s theory might be reformulated in a 
way that leads the duty of assistance to follow from the original position argument, when all 
of the above assumptions are accepted. The main challenge for this reformulation is that, 
given assumption (2), assumption (1) and assumption (3) seem to be incompatible. 
11.2  Under what Idealized Conditions can the 
Principles of International Justice be identified? 
The principles of international justice have direct bearings on all domestic societies, and 
therefore indirect bearings on all individuals. For this reason, it seems natural that, ideally, all 
domestic societies should be represented in the original position. The rules involve all of them 
and affect all of them, including their members. 
This claim is upset by the fact that, ideally, only a certain kind of domestic society 
legitimately can be part of an international social contract deciding the principles of 
international justice. Only representatives for states where there is internal political legitimacy 
should be given a veto power in an international original position. One reason for this is that 
the representatives of some types of states would not have any morally relevant say about 
principles of justice. For instance, the principles of international justice that a representative 
for the state of North Korea would select are not of interest. A state with internal legitimacy 
can only be achieved however, if it is governed by liberal, democratic principles (and 
presented with certain favourable conditions46). I have argued that Rawls is not committed to 
                                                
46 See footnote 45. 
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saying that decent peoples are internally legitimate, and that his inclusion of decent peoples in 
the social contract only argues that decent people are worthy of recognitional legitimacy. One 
might argue that this means that decent peoples should be part of the original position that 
chooses the principles of international justice. For Rawls, however, it is liberal peoples that 
choose the principles. The point of extension to decent peoples is to argue that they also 
would choose the same principles. That decent peoples indeed endorse the same principles is 
only relevant when it is first established that liberal peoples would choose the principles. 
Another condition is, as is natural when theorizing on Rawls’s premises, that the 
parties to the original position do not know their relative strengths, in addition to other similar 
information deemed irrelevant from a moral perspective. This is achieved by the use of a veil 
of ignorance. 
I contend that, ideally, these are the conditions under which the principles of 
international justice should be arrived at. However, these conditions are not consistent with 
each other. It seems that we cannot combine the first judgement that representatives for all 
domestic societies in the world should be represented in the original position, and second 
judgement, that only liberal peoples should be represented. For Rawls this dilemma is 
resolved because he only allows liberal peoples in the first second-level original position 
where the foreign policy principles of liberal democratic peoples are chosen. This seems to be 
the only way to address the issue. However, I will argue that another option is possible. This 
alternative makes it possible to combine all the elements necessary to arrive fairly at the 
principles of international justice. Not only does this strengthen the claims of the principles 
because they are chosen by all affected domestic societies, it also provides a compelling 
argument for why the duty of assistance would be selected, and therefore must be seen as part 
of international justice. 
11.3  Basic Idea: Applying the First-Level Original 
Position in all Domestic Societies 
The basic idea is that when starting with the first-level original position, we assume that since 
its principles are universal in their normative power, as we as liberals believe they are, the 
first level original position is conceived of as having taken place in all domestic societies in 
the world. When we move to the second-level original position, however, which is populated 
by representatives from each of the first-level social contract peoples, the parties to the 
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original position do not know whether the state their people inhabit in fact matches the 
principles of justice selected in the first original position. They might represent the people of 
an outlaw state, a decent society, a liberal society or other possible variants. 
 When such representatives are presented the list of principles in the Law of Peoples, 
there is little question that they would strongly endorse the duty of assistance and the human 
rights requirement. They believe, because they represent a people that have gone through the 
first level original position, that the domestic society they represent should be organized as a 
liberal people. However, they do not know whether this aspiration is matched by the realities. 
This is true even if we model the representatives in the original position as exclusively 
concerned with their rational self-interests, the same way Freeman argues that we should.  
The duty of assistance would be selected because all the representatives know that 
once the veil of ignorance is lifted on the second-level original position, anyone could risk 
being representatives of burdened societies. Some might argue that the representative in this 
original position would endorse a more extensive principle than the duty of assistance. This 
might be true. However, Rawls does not argue that liberal peoples would choose any principle 
of distributive justice among themselves. If he is correct in this assertion, then there is no 
reason to assume that the representatives in my proposed second-level original position would 
argue for further redistribution once they are all liberal. Therefore, whatever principle for 
distributive justice the representatives in my original position affirm, it will be a variant of the 
duty of assistance. Whatever arguments can be made against this claim apply equally to 
Rawls’s claim. For the purposes of this thesis I have accepted that Rawls’s representatives 
would not agree to a more extensive principle than the duty of assistance with its target and 
cut-off point. 
When it comes to the human rights principle, the representatives would, since they 
represent peoples and therefore care about their self-determination and proper self-respect, be 
able to acknowledge that only the violation of some rights warrant coercive measures. There 
is no reason to think that the liberal representatives in this version of the second-level original 
position would come to different conclusions on the value of self-determination for a people 
than the representatives in Rawls’s. And so, if Rawls is right that liberal peoples would 
tolerate decent peoples, also these representatives will agree that some non-liberal, decent 
peoples should be tolerated in the Rawlsian sense, based on the value of self-determination 
for a people. However, based on the first level social contract it is evident that they are firmly 
attached to the idea of liberal justice, and therefore they argue that the universal rights that 
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might not be coercively enforceable such as democratic participation and full freedom of 
speech, in addition to all other liberal rights, are the responsibility of all liberal peoples to 
encourage and try to implement by non-coercive, toleration-compatible (or recognition-
compatible) measures in all societies that are not fully liberal. These soft-power measures, as 
noted earlier, are likely more numerous and more central to contemporary international 
relations than the coercive measures so central to Rawls’s framework. 
The resulting international social contract is fully compatible with the formation of a 
Society of Peoples consisting of both decent and liberal peoples. At the same time, ideal 
theory for international justice is specified as a Society of only Liberal Peoples, a world where 
all individuals enjoy rights to equal democratic participation, freedom of speech and non-
discrimination. 
 Reformulating Rawls’s theory of international justice in this way makes the argument 
that the human rights principle must be acceptable to those that deny that persons should be 
treated as free and equal non-viable. I have argued against this argument and I do not believe 
it to be necessary for Rawls’s purposes. Furthermore, even if we assume that all 
representatives act purely out of self-interest, they would all endorse positive duties across 
borders based on first securing a liberal or decent well-ordered society to all, then further 
implementing liberal rights to all by non-coercive measures. This way, the use of an 
international original position adds considerable normative force to the idea of duties of 
assistance, as well as universal human rights (both internationally enforceable, and 
otherwise). 
11.4  Social Contracts and the Idea of Popular 
Sovereignty: Conceptualizing the Representative of 
the Hypothetical Liberal People. 
One of the most striking features of the theory of international justice sketched above, as it 
relates to Rawls’s account, is that the second-level social contract separates the idea of a 
people, from the institutions of the state in question. In my opinion, it could be said that this 
feature is inherent in the social contract approach. 
The principles resulting from a first-level social contract properly reflects an idealized 
idea of popular sovereignty. By “popular sovereignty” I mean that the power of the state is 
rooted in the collective people through the agreement in the original position of the social 
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contract. It is idealized because it is formed under the constraints of the first-level original 
position with its veil of ignorance. The international theory of justice I sketched above takes 
this idea of popular sovereignty to the second-level social contract and its original position. 
The appeal to the idea of popular sovereignty and its relationship to the idea of social 
contracts, helps conceptualize the proposed approach. By this I mean that the idea of popular 
sovereignty gives meaning to the idea of representatives of domestic societies that does not 
exist at the institutional level. The idea of the people is separated from the reality of the state 
for the purposes of the second-level original position. 
Without this concept it would perhaps seem less plausible that representatives of 
hypothetical liberal states met in an original position. For instance, why should a 
representative for a state that turns out, after the veil(s) of ignorance is lifted, to be an outlaw 
state, be represented in the second level original position as a liberal people? The answer is 
that all domestic societies should be represented in the original position. Furthermore, the 
representatives should be modelled as representing states that qualify for internal legitimacy. 
The relationship between this domestic theory ideal and the idea of popular sovereignty, 
however, tells us how we can conceptualize such a representative. 
The principles required for internal political legitimacy are arrived at through a social 
contract that reflects an ideal conception of popular sovereignty (the first level original 
position). Since only the actual people, and not the institutions that form part of the basic 
structure of their society, are represented in the original position, the resulting principles for 
how the basic structure of the state should be organized, transcends any actual institutions, 
they only belong to the individuals that form part of the social contract. Therefore a liberal 
people can be represented in a second-level original position just on the merit of the first-level 
original position. 
The institutions of a Rawlsian liberal people are closely connected to an idea of 
popular sovereignty through the use of the social contract to legitimize them. Since the power 
of the state, through the social contract, belongs to the people, the state and the people can be 
separated for the purposes of the second-level original position. This way it is, in my opinion, 
conceptually possible, even plausible, to populate the second-level original position with 
representatives of all domestic societies in the world, and at the same time imagine that all 
these representatives in effect are representatives for liberal domestic societies. 
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11.5  The Merits of the Proposed Theory 
The theory of international justice I have proposed, which is a reformulation of Rawls’s Law 
of Peoples, has several important benefits. 
 To begin with, it is compatible with Rawls’s judgements on toleration and 
internationally enforceable human rights in LP, whilst at the same time distancing itself from 
the morally relativistic arguments that LP is rightly criticized for. Furthermore, it incorporates 
non-coercive measures by liberal peoples into the theory. Such measures are arguably as 
important as coercive measures, when it comes to changing the policies of other states. 
Rawls’s framework simply allows for such measures. I hold that they are central to justice in 
international relations. These changes however, are possible to incorporate into the Law of 
Peoples with less dramatic changes than the one I propose. However, my sketched theory has 
at least three more significant benefits. 
 First, all the peoples in the world are represented in my proposed second-level original 
position. Therefore all the individuals in the world are indirectly represented. One might ask 
what is the usefulness of this broad representation. Rawls for instance, only lets liberal and 
decent peoples into the original position(s). And the latter only after making the argument that 
they are capable of agreeing to the same principles as put forth by liberal peoples. This 
however, is asking the wrong question. The right question is why any domestic society should 
be omitted from the social contract in the first place. As all are part of international relations, 
all are relevant subjects of the theory. Rawls however, has good reason for restricting the 
selection of the principles of international justice to certain types of domestic societies. 
Because the motivations and goals of societies that are not at least decent and well ordered are 
not compatible with anything we could accept as a reasonably just Law of Peoples, their 
viewpoints are not of interest. However, I have shown how representatives for any domestic 
society in the world could and should be modelled in a way so this problem is avoided. The 
idea of popular sovereignty inherent in the first-level social contract allows for the people and 
the state to be separated for the purposes of the second original position. Therefore, the reason 
why the original position is restricted to only some domestic societies is gone. 
 Second, recall Reidy’s argument that liberal peoples choose which human rights are 
internationally enforceable by asking themselves at what level of internal justice they would 
see themselves as deserving of self-determination. Reidy argues that in light of this question 
Rawls’s list of human rights is plausible, because only rights necessary for a viable 
constitutional republic would be chosen. One benefit of the second-level original position I 
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have constructed is that it enables a fair balance between the value of self-determination and 
the ideal of liberal justice. The representatives have an interest in the self-determination of 
their society, which will be challenged if the domestic societies they represent do not respect 
internationally enforceable human rights. At the same time, they are committed to the ideals 
of liberal justice. The “proper subset” of the rights of a constitutional democracy they would 
choose as internationally enforceable human rights then, will signal where they put the 
balancing point between the value of self-determination and liberal justice. The argument 
about when self-determination is warranted is, of course, possible to make without using the 
second-level original position as I have constructed it. However, the weighing of the two 
values has direct bearings on the representatives in my version of the second-level original 
position. It might be easier to evaluate whether Reidy’s argument is sound when the 
consequences of the choice have direct bearings on the choosers. For example, if too much 
emphasis is placed on self-determination in Rawls’s version of the original position, there are 
no consequences for the representatives of liberal peoples that decide the balance point. In my 
version a wrong balance point will have significant negative repercussions for the represented 
parties. The benefit here is that when the original position is constructed the way I have 
argued for, we might more clearly evaluate the relationship between the value of self-
determination and liberal justice. 
 Third, and most importantly, due to the way I have set up the original position, the 
international social contract affords added normative force to positive duties across borders 
and to the idea of universal human rights. The duty of assistance, with all its demands of fair 
trade relations with burdened societies as well as transfers to raise such societies out of 
poverty, undoubtedly follows from my version of the second-level original position47. This is 
not the case in Rawls’s version. As such, the theory I have sketched provides the answer to 
the second question of this thesis. 
 
                                                
47 It might be argued that the duty of assistance as Rawls conceives of it does not include any measures to 
domestic societies that have enough resources to sustain decent or liberal institutions, but where the wielders of 
power choose not to reform. The human rights situation in this society might be bad, but since the wielders of 
power do not want to change the system of governance, the duty of assistance does not address the human rights 
problem. Pogge (2006, 212) argues that the basic needs of human beings in benevolent absolutisms and outlaw 
states are ignored by Rawls. It could be this understanding of the duty of assistance is not particularly charitable 
of Rawls’s position. However, in my version of the second-level original position it seems likely that the 
representatives would agree to a humanitarian commitment as part of the duty of assistance, which specifies that 
the international community should protect urgent human rights directly. 
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11.6  The Problems of the Proposed Theory 
Despite the significant benefits associated with the theory I have outlined in this chapter, 
some potential concerns also arise. First, it takes a stance on the universal applicability of 
Rawls’s first-level social contract. Although Rawls does not say that his account of decency 
gives an account of justice or internal legitimacy for a non-liberal society, he also refrains 
from saying that liberalism is universal. I have argued that LP does not need to say this, 
because it is exclusively concerned with the issue of recognitional legitimacy. However, I 
have constructed the second-level original position using the assumption that for there to be 
political legitimacy in a domestic society, the members must be treated as free and equal. 
Therefore laws that discriminate against certain groups like women, certain ethnicities, or 
religious minorities, as well as laws that put unreasonable limits on the freedom of speech, 
cannot, according to this assumption, be morally justified. For a domestic society then, to be 
internally legitimate, it must be a liberal people, adhering to certain principles specified by 
first-level original position. 
Second (and related to the first point), although Rawls does not use decency as a 
standard for internal legitimacy in non-liberal societies, he (1999b, 70) does say that “(…) an 
original position argument for domestic justice (…) does not apply to the domestic justice of a 
decent hierarchical regime”. In other words, the first-level original position cannot be used in 
non-liberal societies. The reason for this is that “[o]nly equal parties can be symmetrically 
situated in an original position” (Rawls 1999b, 70). In societies where all individuals are not 
seen or treated as free and equal, they are not situated symmetrically. Rawls’s theories then, 
seem to be agnostic when it comes to internal legitimacy and justice in non-liberal societies. 
 Huseby (2007, 256) has argued that, since Rawls’s first-level original position is 
restricted to members of societies that are already governed by liberal ideas, it is subject to 
“(…) dramatic limitations as to its scope”. 
 
In a way, this theory of justice kicks in after the most fundamental fact. It applies only 
after persons are allowed to see themselves as free and equal. Those who do not have 
the opportunity to conceive themselves thus, are left to their own devices (Huseby 
2007, 256) 
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I agree with Huseby here48. The arbitrary fact that a society is organized hierarchically 
seems a poor reason for why we cannot use an original position argument to specify 
principles of justice and legitimacy for such a society. One might say that it makes little sense 
to model representatives in an original position as reasonable, when the individuals they 
represent are in fact not reasonable, and for instance believe women are not equal to men. 
Thus they would not be willing to propose and abide by mutually acceptable rules, even if 
assured that others would also do so (Rawls 1993, 49). However, it seems to me that 
whenever justice and the legitimate use of power are the issues at stake, it makes perfect sense 
to model representatives as reasonable. If we do not assume that the representatives in the 
social contract should be modelled as reasonable, then what such representatives might say 
about justice is not of interest. 
According to Huseby (2007, 255) there is “(…) nothing in Rawls’s grounds for 
freedom and equality that could not be transferred to the members of hierarchical societies”. It 
might be a problem for the theory I have sketched that it relies on such a transfer, because it 
seemingly breaks with some of the fundamental assumptions of Rawls’s constructivist 
approach. However, I agree with Huseby (20007, 256) that to deny members of hierarchical 
societies a ticket to the domestic original position because they are not treated as free and 
equal is not a compelling argument. It might be the case that this brief discussion opens up 
deeper questions concerning the nature of Rawls’s constructivist approach. However, this is 
not the place for addressing such questions. 
 In this chapter I have shown how Rawls’s international theory can be adjusted in a 
way that affords added normative force to the idea of positive duties across borders. I have 
argued that this can be seen as necessary, because Rawls fails to provide a compelling 
argument for why the parties to the international original position(s) would put these duties on 
themselves. My sketching of an international theory of justice combines intuitions from 
liberal cosmopolitanism with the judgements and general approach of Rawls’s theory. In 
conclusion, I have discussed some of the benefits and problems associated with the theory of 
international justice I have sketched. 
                                                
48 However, I disagree with a related inference Huseby draws from this statement, namely that Rawls’s theories 
justify the status quo of hierarchical peoples. As I have argued, Rawls only commits to saying that decent 
peoples deserve recognitional legitimacy, not that they are internally legitimate. If this assessment is correct, 
Rawls makes no justification on the internal legitimacy or justice of decent non-liberal societies. Concequently 
their status quo is not justified. 
86 
 
12  Conclusion 
Upon conclusion of this thesis, it is evident that a need exists to summarize the different 
arguments presented. An overview is provided in pages V and VI. Additionally, section 1.2.2 
also provides a brief summary of the claims made. Therefore, I conclude by focusing sharply 
on the questions originally presented and the relationships between the various arguments that 
address them. 
12.1  Addressing The First Question: Main 
Arguments 
The first question of this thesis has been the following:  
(1) Can the conception of human rights Rawls adopts in the Law of Peoples be 
plausibly defended? 
This thesis has reflected on this question mainly in light of three interpretations of Rawls’s 
position. I have argued that the fact (if it is a fact) that international society involves a larger 
variety of moral beliefs than a democratic society does not amount to a compelling argument 
for why the human rights principle must be acceptable to those that reject liberalism as merely 
western. Furthermore I find it very hard to believe that liberal peoples would acknowledge 
this argument. Liberal peoples would not argue that there is a need to develop principles that 
are objective between their liberal conceptions of justice and beliefs that deny the most basic 
assumptions of liberalism. I do not claim that these are original arguments. I take them to be 
central to criticism of Rawls made by numerous liberal critics49. I am confident that the 
argument that the human rights principle must be acceptable to those that reject liberalism 
does not amount to a plausible defence of the conception of human rights in the Law of 
Peoples. However, as has become clear throughout this thesis, this does not rule out the result 
that the human rights principle is acceptable to those that deny liberalism. 
 Reidy’s argument that a liberal people’s own claims to self-determination correspond 
with a polity that only respects Rawls’s list of human rights is, in my opinion, plausible. As 
such Reidy provides a plausible defence for the conception of human rights in the Law of 
Peoples. The result of this argument is a list of human rights that is in fact acceptable to those 
                                                
49 These include, but are not restricted to Buchanan (2006), Huseby (2007), Pogge (2006) and Tan (2005). 
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that deny liberalism as merely western. However, this does not mean that a desire to make 
concessions to such beliefs underline the decision to keep the list narrow. Several objections 
could be made against Reidy’s justification. It could be said to overvalue self-determination at 
the expense of liberal justice. Additionally, it could be said rely on a form of selection bias. 
Furthermore, it relies on the understanding that the role of the human rights principle is to 
specify when forceful intervention can be legitimately applied. However, I do not think these 
objections defeat the argument. 
Freeman argues that the representatives of liberal peoples should be modelled as 
exclusively self-interested. According to Freeman, this would lead to the list of human rights 
that Rawls presents. Freeman argues that under the veil of ignorance, none of the 
representatives know if the people they represent have neighbouring countries that do not 
respect or honour Rawls’s list of human rights. Furthermore that all such states are dangerous 
to the security and rights of the members of at least the surrounding countries. The 
representatives of liberal peoples would therefore select Rawls’s list of human rights. I am 
confident that Freeman is wrong in his assessment. Firstly, if the representatives of liberal 
peoples were to ignore the belief of all liberal peoples that all individuals should enjoy both 
urgent and liberal human rights, they could simply opt to handle dangerous states according to 
whichever measure would best guarantee the safety of liberal peoples and the rights of their 
citizens. Sometimes it would be rational to help a dangerous state develop to a well-ordered 
people. However, liberal peoples would ignore states with strong institutional power and strict 
control over its members even if it subjected these members to the cruellest forms of 
oppression. Secondly, presuming that the representatives know that one of the roles of human 
rights is to function as a criterion for inclusion in the Society of Peoples, it would not be fair 
to model them to ignore the moral convictions of liberal peoples. I have argued that there are 
plausible reasons to tolerate decent peoples, however, Freemans suggestion on how this 
conclusion should be arrived at betrays the beliefs of liberal peoples. In my opinion this 
means that it would be unreservedly reasonable for liberal peoples to reject the human rights 
principle that their representatives have selected as too narrow. This does not mean that it 
would be wrong of liberal peoples to endorse Rawls’s version of the human rights principle. It 
only means that they could not possibly be expected to accept it in light of Freeman’s 
proposed justification. Freeman relies on an unsettling dissonance between the representatives 
and represented. This dissonance is untenable. It is mainly because of these two arguments 
that Freeman does not provide a plausible defence of the conception of human rights in the 
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Law of Peoples. However, I have discussed additional arguments as well. Freeman’s 
proposed justification is unappealingly instrumental. Furthermore, it seemingly contradicts 
Rawls’s own account. 
12.2  Addressing the Second Question: A 
Culmination of the Preceding Discussions 
The second question of this thesis has been the following: 
(2) Bearing in mind the criticisms of Rawls’s conception of human rights identified in 
the treatment of question (1), how can the Law of Peoples be adjusted in a way that 
affords added normative force to the idea of positive duties across societies? 
 
While I have allocated considerable space to address question (1), the treatment of question 
(2) is only briefly analysed in one chapter. Furthermore, while question (1) deals with the 
human rights principle, question (2) focuses on the duty of assistance. As such, question (2) 
might seem a bit out of place. However, the addressing of this question serves as a 
culmination of the all the discussions relevant for the answering of question (1). 
First, the theory proposed in the chapter that addresses question (2) treats the argument 
that a human rights principle must be acceptable to those that reject liberalism as non-viable. 
Second, my claim that the proposed theory does not contradict the judgements of the Law of 
Peoples rests partly on my argument that within LP, Rawls only takes a stance on the question 
of recognitional legitimacy. Third, the proposed theory shows how Freeman’s contention that 
the representatives should be modelled as rational and self-interested can be achieved in a 
way that does not betray the basic interests of liberal peoples. Fourth, the proposed theory 
serves to better evaluate Reidy’s justification for Rawls’s list of human rights. Fifth, Reidy’s 
defence depends on the assumption that the role of human rights is to specify when coercive 
sanction is allowed. This could be seen as problematic because the contemporary role of 
human rights is more extensive than Rawls’s account and human rights are often implemented 
by less dramatic measures than those described by Rawls. Therefore, my proposed theory 
incorporates non-coercive and soft-power measures aimed at implementing human rights. 
While the thesis attributes significantly less text to question (2) than that of question (1), it is 
nonetheless written in such a way that reflects upon and incorporates much of the preceding 
discussion. Therefore it is thoroughly connected to the rest of the thesis. Of course, my 
89 
 
proposed theory does in fact also answer the question at hand and show how Rawls’s 
international theory of justice can be adjusted in a way that affords added normative force to 
the idea of positive duties across borders. Furthermore it serves as an example of how certain 
liberal cosmopolitan convictions can be combined with the judgements and general approach 
in LP. 
 These remarks comprise the conclusion to this thesis. Reflecting on the points made in 
the two sections of this final chapter, it is clear that this thesis has achieved its primary 
objectives. 
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